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ABSTRACT 
Coherent Odds and Bayesian Odds 
Let X = {x} be a sample space, 9 = [8} be a parameter space, and 
p(x, 8) be a probability mass function in x for all e. A statement 
of the form P(8 e cf x} = Ci is called a "probability assertion." Testing 
the validity of probability assertions is viewed as a game between two players, 
Peter and Paul, under the supervision of a master of ceremonies. The latter 
selects 8 e 8, draws x randomly according to p(x, e ), and reveals x 
0 0 
{but not 8 ) to Peter and Paul. Peter chooses N = N(x) subsets 
0 
c1(x), ... , CN(x) of 9 and asserts the probability ai(x) of 8 0 belonging 
to Ci(x) for each i. Paul tests the validity of the assertions by specifying 
a strategy s which determines bets placed on or against the events 
0
0
e c1 (x), ... , 80 e Cix) at odds determined by the probabilities ai(x). 
After the bets are placed 8
0 
is disclosed and Paul receives a payoff based 
on the amount of his wager, the odds, and the truth or falsity of the events. 
cfX (8) denotes the expected payoff to Paul when Peter uses strategy ~, 
s 
Paul strategy s, and e is true. 
Cornfield (Biometrics 25 (1969) 617-658) and Freedman and Purves 
(Annals of Mathematical Statistics 40 (1969) 1177-1186) have considered 
problems of this kind when X and ® are both finite and Peter must choose 
all subsets of 9. Cornfield defines a to be coherent if there exists 
no s such that for all a and e. The 
main results of Cornfield and of Freedman and Purves show that a is coherent 
if and only if it is i•n-Bayes" for some 11: that is, the probabilities a.{x) 
]. 
correspond to posterior probabilities for some prior distribution n. 
The present thesis gives generalizations to countably infinite (and 
- i -
continuous) spaces X and ®· Here TT can be either proper or improper, 
and it is shown that a slightly stricter definition of coherence is needed 
to obtain the following theorem: If X and ® are countable and if for 
some 1 < p < co, p(x, •) e tP for all x, and if a is coherent, then 
is TT-Bayes for some TT e l, q, q = p/ (p-1). Cases when p = 1 or co 
are also considered. The proofs of these results use separation theorems 
of functional analysis. 
If Peter is required to assert the probabilities of all possible 
subsets of 8 given x and if the class of strategies which Paul can 
use is suitably restricted, then it is shown that coherence again implies 
that a is TT-Bayes. Moreover, a must agree with a countably additive 
set function on all possible subsets of 8 for each x. 
Generalizations to continuous X and ® spaces are given for the 
case when l\1(x) is identically equal to one. These results are related 
to the theory of confidence intervals and to Buehler (Annals of Mathematical 
Statistics 30 (1959) 845-863) and Wallace (Annals of Mathematical Statistics 
30 (1959) 864-876). 
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CHAPTER I 
Introduction and Summary 
1.1 Introduction. 
Statistical techniques which specify the degree of uncertainty 
of an inference about a set or sets of parameter values can be divided 
into two major categories, Bayesian and non-Bayesian. Through the 
use of a prior the Bayesian assigns a posterior distribution over the 
parameter space ~. Non-Bayesian procedures include confidence regions 
which look like a partial specification of a probability distribution. 
Other assignments not fitting a confidence interval scheme can be 
imagined. 
Following Buehler (1959) we examine the implications of viewing 
inference as a game between two players. Peter makes inferences while 
Paul questions their validity by placing bets for which he receives 
a payoff proportional to the degree of uncertainty of the inference 
and its truth or falsity. 
Cornfield (1969) also studied such a game for finite sample and 
parameter spaces in light of coherence, a property involving expected 
payoffs to Paul. Peter's assertions or inferences, as defined by 
Cornfield, are coherent if there does not exist any betting scheme 
such that the expected payoff to Paul is non-negative for all a 
and positive for some 9. (In the body of the thesis we call this 
strict coherence.) If Peter's assertions are consistent with posterior 
probabilities corresponding to some (proper or improper) prior measure 
TT, then they will be called Bayes with respect to (w.r.tJ TT• 
In the same year Freedman and Purves (1969) introduced a game 
- 1 -
for finite spaces phrased in terms of odds. Apart from difficulties 
posed by infinite odds, the Cornfield, Freedman and Purves papers 
show that Peter's assertions are coherent if and only if they are 
Bayes w.r.t. some ff• 
Basicly this thesis is an extension of this type of result to 
countably infinite or continuous spaces. One consideration for the 
infinite spaces is the use of improper priors; another is a suitable 
definition of coherence. As we shall see, a straightforward extension 
of coherence for finite to infinite spaces is not strong enough to 
imply a Bayesian solution. 
1.2 Summary 
The papersof Cornfield (1969) and Freedman and Purves (1969) 
require Peter to post either probabilities or odds for all proper subsets 
r 
• 
' I i I 
I 
.. 
of the parameter space given an observed sample point. Often in statistical I-. 
inference, for an observed sample poin~ assertions are required for a 
single subset of the parameter space. This subset usually varies with 
the observation as in confidence interval applications, but conceivably 
it could be fixed. 
For finite spaces, Chapter II formulates a Peter-Paul game (in terms 
of odds) in which Peter, given a sample point, may be required to make 
probability assertions on fewer than all subsets, possibly only one. 
We.have a slight extension of previous results by showing that, for 
finite odds, Peter is coherent if and only if for some n he is Bayes 
w.r.t. ff• By giving a slightly different twist to conventions intro-
duced by Freedman and Purves (1969), we extend this result to include 
cases where the odds may be infinite. From the development of Chapter 
- 2 -
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II we will see that games phrased in terms of probability assertions 
(as is done in later chapters} appear to be better suited for studying 
statistical inference techniques than their counterparts based on odds. 
Having introduced a Peter-Paul game in finite spaces, we consider 
some mathematical results which will be needed when studying games for 
more general spaces. The basic concept used in Chapter II to show that 
coherence implies a Bayesian solution is the existence of a positive 
vector {all elements of the vector are greater than zero) orthogonal 
to a subspace containing no semi-positive vector. Chapter III provides 
analogous tools which will be applied in countably infinite models 
{Chapter IV) or continuous models (Chapter VI). 
Conditions for the existence of an orthogonal vector in more 
general spaces are not as simple as those for the finite dimensional 
spaces. The development begins with a normed linear space which con-
tains a linear manifold and a convex cone. The 
manifold and the cone are said to have an empty expanded intersection 
if there is a positive distance between the manifold and the cone after 
the cone has been translated by any member of itself. Under this assumption 
we show the existence of a continuous linear functional which separates 
the manifold and the cone. Later this is specialized to either tp 
{for countably infinite models) or LP {for continuous models), where 
the cone is the set of all semi-positive vectors. The representation 
of continuous linear functionals in these spaces gives the existence 
of an orthogonal vector in t 4 {for tp spaces) or function in Lq {for 
LP spaces} where q = p/(p - 1}; p e (1, m). Results are also stated 
for p = 1 or•· 
- 3 -
Having this at our disposal Chapter IV introduces two models 
for countably infinite spaces phrased in terms of probability assertions. 
Model I deals with the case where Peter is required to make a finite 
number of assertions for each observed sample point while Model II 
handles a countable number. We modify the definition of coherence to 
mean that the space of all expected payoffs to Paul and the semi-positive 
vectors have an empty expanded intersection. If for some p e [1, =), 
f(x, a) e iP as a vector in e for all X (f is the probability 
mass function used in calculating the expected payoff function), then 
the modified version of coherence in Model I implies that Peter's pro-
bability assertions are Bayes w.r.t. TT for some TT e 
To study cases where p ==,we consider a Bayes' solution based 
on a finitely additive set function which plays the role of a prior 
and state an analogous result. 
In Model II coherence implies not only a Bayesian solution but 
also that Peter's assignments must agree with a countably additive 
probability measure on the parameter space. This is true for all 
p e [ 1, =]. 
• 
• 
! ,' 
\ I 
I : 
~ 
I 
~ 
! I 
~ 
... 
Now that we have mentioned that coherence implies a Bayes' solution, __. 
what can be said about the converse? It _is not surprising that a Bayes' 
solution w.r.t. a proper (t n(8) = 1) prior will be coherent. In 
Chapter V we present sufficient conditions which show, that in Model I, 
this is also true for some Bayesian solutions based on an improper prior 
in Lq. However, many questions with regard to the converse remain open. 
Chapter VI introduces a model for continuous spaces in which Peter 
is required to make only one probability assertion for an observed sample 
- 4 -
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point. Statistical interpretation of this game has implications in 
confidence interval.theory. Because of measure theoretic aspects, 
coherence is ~odified to imply that there is no almost everywhere 
semi-positive (i.e. no function which is almost everywhere non-negative 
and positive on a set of positive measure) expected payoff function 
available to Paul. 
For densities satisfying very mild assumptions, we show that if 
Peter is coherent, then his probability assertions are Bayes w.r.t. 
some prior TT in LP for suitable p. Once again the choice of p 
depends on tffi density .used to calculate the expected payoff. We 
briefly discuss the converse problem and move on to compare our model 
and its properties with those of Buehler (1959) and Wallace (1959). 
These papers are concerned with the conditional behavior of confidence 
intervals. 
The basic results of this thesis are (i) the conditions under 
which there is a vector orthogonal to an infinite dimensional linear 
manifold, and (ii) the application of this to show that coherence requires 
Peter to be consistent with Bayes' rule in the various models that we 
consider. From the contrapositive of these results we see that if Peter 
is not Bayes from some TT, then there is a betting strategy for Paul 
which yields an expected payoff which is never negative, and for some 
value or values of 8 is positive. 
- 5 -
CHAPTER II 
Finite Discrete Parameter and Sample Spaces 
2.1 Introduction. 
The material in this chapter has its origin in the papers of 
Cornfield (1969) and Freedman and Purves (1969). Essentially, 
they consider a game between two players; the first one posts odds 
(Freedman and Purves) or probabilities (Cornfield) on a random 
event while the second player places stakes or bets on the event. 
The outcome of the event is determined and the second player receives 
a payoff which depends on the stakes, the odds or probabilities, and 
the outcome. We call such a game a Peter-Paul game; the characters 
are from Buehler (1959), who describes a similar model. Since the 
Peter-Paul game of this chapter is based on odds ·as in Freedman and 
Purves (1969) while the theo.rems are stated in terms of coherence, 
a property described by Cornfield (1969), we have a blend of these 
papers. 
As in Cornfield_ (1969) and Freedman and Purves (1969), this 
chapter deals with finite sample and parameter spaces where the 
mathematics does not obscure the spirit of the Peter-Paul game. 
Hopefully, this will serve to introduce the reader to our notation 
and familiarize him with some concepts common to later chapters, even 
though we switch to games phrased in terms of probabilities. From 
the development we will see that the possibility of infinite odds 
introduces difficulties which appear to be more of a nuisance than 
of value. We will base our approach to handling infinite odds on a 
convention of Freedman and Purves (1969). Although we do not state 
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Peter-Paul games in terms of odds for more general spaces due to 
the difficulties encountered with infinite odds, our method of handling 
infinite odds in finite spaces should easily extend to more general 
spaces. 
Section 2.2 describes the finite space Peter-Paul game based on 
odds. Section 2.3 studies games where the odds are finite and presents 
an aspect of the game <:alled coherence {as defined by Cornfield). 
Theorem 2.2 of this section is similar to Theorem 1 of Freedman and 
Purves (1969) or Section 6 of Cornfield (1969). The conclusion of 
Theorem 2.2 holds even when Peter is required to post odds on only 
one event, and for this reason, it can be considered a slight extension 
of a result of Freedman and Purves (1969) and Cornfield (1969). Section 
2.4 presents a parallel theorem when the odds may be infinite. 
2.2 Description of a Peter-Paul Game for Finite Spaces. 
Freedman and Purves (1969) suggest a model similar to the following 
Peter-Paul game. Let @) and X be fixed finite sets and let p (x, ·e) 
be a prob~bility mass function in x for every a. To avoid trivial 
details we assume that for each x e X 
(2.1) p(x, a)> 0 for some 8 e@. 
Let a be a collection of proper subsets of ® which may or may not 
be closed under complementation. Consider three persons who 
participate in a game: a master of ceremonies, Peter,and Paul. 
The master of ceremonies chooses and fixes the sets in G. Then 
he selects 9 e@ and draws x e X according to the p.m.f. based on 9. 
The x is announced to Peter and Paul, but 9 is retained by the master 
of ceremonies until the odds are posted and bets are placed. 
- 7 -
Peter is required to post odds X{x, A) where O ~ X(x, A)< oo 
for all A ea. Given that, x was revealed, X{x, A) is the odds 
against the event that the master of ceremonies chose 9 e A. We 
consider the set of odds which Peter specifies to be a strategy and 
denote it by X. If the probability P(9 e Ajx) + 0 is known and 
the odds are consistent with these probabilities, then 
~ 
'J 
X(x, A)= P(9 e Ajx)/P(9 e Ajx). A\ -1 It is noted that if X(x, A)= {X{x,A,) , 
\ 
I 
... 
u 
i 
illli 
\ ! I 
... 
then X{x, A) is consistent with the probability P(9 e Ajx) = (l(x,A)+l)-1.: 
1 
.... 
In contrast to Freedman and Purves (1969) our assumptions do not include 
the relationship l(x, A)= (X{x, A)+ 1)-l and, in fact, this equality 
is a consequence of the Peter-Paul game and coherence. 
Paul's role in the game is to test the validity of Peter's odds. 
Hence, with the knowledge of x and Peter's odds, Paul places 
bets or stakes s{x, A) for all A ea. The s{x, A) are stakes 
on the event 9 e A given x and are assumed to be finite. We denote 
Paul's strategy by s. After the odds and stakes are determined, the 
master of ceremonies reveals 9 so that Peter and Paul can settle up. 
For each A ea, Paul gains 
(2.2) l{x, A)s{x, A) 
- s{x, A) 
if 9 e A 
if e e A • 
For the chosen x, the payoff to Paul is the sum over A ea. Since 
the values in (2.2) are finite, the payoff is well defined. 
Note that this game allows Paul to use both negative and positive 
stakes, which in effect, permits him to bet on or against any A. If 
G is closed under complementation and if X(x, A)= (A{x, A)+ 1)-1 , 
then for any strategy s containing negative stakes there is a 
- 8 -
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strategy s' consisting of non-negative stakes with the same payoff 
to Paul. Since our assumptions do not include that a is closed under 
complements and the equality of l{x, A) and {l(x, A)+ 1)-1 , it is 
possible that there does not exist a strategy s' containing only 
non-negative stakes which has a payoff identical to a strategy s 
having negative stakes. Thus, this Peter-Paul game differs from one 
having only betting strategies which contain non-negative bets. Later 
we will see the mathematical convenience behind allowing non-negative 
stakes. Next we define an expected payoff to Paul. 
Definition 2 .1. 
GA(9) will denote the expected payoff to Paul when Peter's 
s 
strategy is A and Paul's is s. It is computed as 
(2.3) G1 (9) = ~ ~ {[l(x, A)+l]IA(0)-l)s(x, A)p(x, 9). 
8 AeG xeX 
Since the right hand side of (2.3) is a finite sum of tenns which 
are finite, G1(e) is well defined. 
s 
2.3 Finite X and ® Spaces with Finite Odds. 
Now let us focus our attention on the behavior of G~(0) as a 
function in 0 for a fixed strategy A as Paul varies s. To 
accommodate this,we present a series of definitions found in Gale 
( 1960 , p • 4 3 ) • Let 
~ = (vl' v2,•••, vm) 
Definition 2.2. 
v be a vector in Rm 
-
00 
or R that is, 
v. are in ( -oo , oo) • 
]. 
~ is non-negative (written ~?: Q) if and only if 
all i. 
v. > 0 for 
1 -
~ is positive (written v > 0) if and only if 
- -
- 9 -
v. > 0 for all i. 
1. 
~ is semi-positive {written ~::: .Q) if and only if v > 0 and 
-- -
~ + Q. 
Cornfield (1969) studied a property of G~(8) called coherence; 
our version is essentially the same. 
Definition 2.3. 
When ® is a finite space, Peter's strategy A is called 
strictly [weakly] coherent if there does not exist a strategy s such 
that GA(9) > 0 [GA(9) > 0]. 
s--- s- -
The following is an interpretation of strict coherence. Assume 
that A is strictly coherent. If for any strategy s there exists 
a 0 in ® such that GA(8) > 0, then there is a s 
that GA(0') < 0. 
s 
a' in ® such 
Cornfield (1969) and Freedman and Purves (1969) examine the case 
when X and e are finite, and a is either the collection of all 
subsets or all proper subsets of ®· In terms of coherence their 
results roughly state that Peter's A is strictly coherent if and only 
if A is determined by a Bayes' procedure. This chapter extends the 
, 
.. 
, -
\ 
I 
'-
! 
I I 
I 
'-
I I 
--
I I 
theory to cases where a may contain fewer than all the proper subsets 1 • 
of ®, possibly only one. In this situation the Peter-Paul game can 
be given a hypothesis testing interpretation. The development of 
this theory uses a result connnonly found in linear programming, which 
is presented for the sake of completeness. 
Theorem 2.1 (Gale (1960), p. 48-49) • 
Let D be a m by n m matrix; !. e R and n !., € R • Exactly 
one of the following alternatives holds. Either there exists !_> Q.. 
[w > O] such that 
---
- 10 -
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(2.4) !P = Q 
or there exists !.. e Rn such that 
(2.5) Ds > 0 
---
[Ds > O]. 
- -
We interpret a portion of Theorem 2.1 as follows. Let ~ be 
the linear space spanned by the column vectors of D, and let P be 
the set of all semi-positive vectors in Rm. If there is no vector 
in ~ and in P, then there exists a vector v such that v > 0 
and v · is orthogonal to ~. In finite dimensional spaces this is 
quite clear and the proof is easy. A picture for R2 is shown in 
Figure 1. Application of this theorem (and its analogues for iP 
V 
-
Figure lo 
and LP spaces developed in Chapter III) is the key in solving a 
necessary condition for coherence. We pause for one more definition 
before applying Theorem 2.1 to the Peter-Paul game. 
Definition 2.4. 
Peter's A is proper Bayes with respect to (w.r.t.) TT if and 
only if there exists a function TT such that n:@ - (0, M), where . 
M < oo , and for al 1 x e X and A e Ct 
(2.6) X ( x , A) = ( 6 p ( x , 9) n( 9 ) ) I ( ~ p ( x , 9) n( 9) ) • 
9eA 9e:A 
- 11 -
For notational simplicity, suppose {x1}~1 , {8j)~=~ and {Ak)~=l 
are enumerations of X, ®, and a respectively. To shorten the· 
notation let 
(2.7) p(xi, ej) = p(i, e.) = p(i, j) J 
n(ej) = 1Tj 
).(xi' ~) = ).(i, Ak) = ).{i, k) ' 
s{x., 
1 ~) = S{i, ~) = S{i, k). 
Theorem 2.2. 
Assume X, ®, and a are finite where a contains n subsets 
of ®, and assume all the odds in Peter's ). are finite. Then ). 
is strictly [weakly] coherent if and only if ). is proper Bayes 
w.r.t. TT> 0 [n> O]. -.. --- ____ _....,,,., 
Proof: 
Let D be a p by m • n matrix with column vectors d.k(e), 
1 -
for i = 1, ••• , m; k = 1, ••• , n, where the elements of dik(~) are 
(2.8) dik(e) = [().{i, k) + 1)1~(0) - 1Jp(i, e). 
Any strategy s can be represented as a n • m by 1 vector s 
-
having elements s(i, k). Then the payoff to Paul can be written 
(2.9) G).(0) = D s • s - pxnom n•mxl 
Assume ). is strictly coherent. Then there does not exist any 
s such that .!?!_~ 2.• By Theorem 2.1 there exists n> £ such that 
n'D = O. This implies 
- -
(2.10) 
p 
6 d .k( j )TTJ. = 0 for all i and k, 
. 1 1 J= 
which implies that ). is proper Bayes by rewriting (2.10) as (2.6). 
- 12 -
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Assume A is proper Bayes w.r.t. !!.> Q. From (2.6) a simple 
computation gives n'dik(~) = 0 for all i and k; that is, :rr'D = O. 
By Theorem 2.1 there does not exist any !. such that Q!_~ 2.• This 
implies A is strictly coherent. A similar proof holds for weakly 
coherent. D 
Theorem 2.2 proves that strict coherence implies l is proper 
Bayes w.r.t. TT> o. From equation (2.6) we have i(x, A)= (l(x, A))-l 
and thus l(x, A) is consistent with the probability P(0 e Alx) = 
(l(x, A)+ 1)-1• If a contains all the proper subsets of @, then 
an argument of Freedman and Purves (1969) shows that the prior TT is 
unique. If a contains fewer than all proper subsets, however, then 
TT may not be uniquely determined. This occurs when the column space 
of D has dimension less than p - 1. Here is an example. 
Example 2.1. 
Let @= {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6), A= {1, 2} and X = { 1, 2). 
Values of p(x, 9) 
p{x, 9) 91 92 93 94 65 96 
xl .8 .2 .6 .4 .9 .1 
x2 .2 .8 .4 .6 .1 .9 
Let TT'= (1/6, 1/6, 1/6, 1/6, 1/6, 1/6). Then the Bayes' odds w.r.t. 
TT are 
l(l, A)= 2 
l(2, A) = 2 
l(l, A) = ½ 
l(l, A) = ½ ' 
and these odds are strictly coherent by Theorem 2.2. Now the Bayes' 
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odds w.r.t. n' = (1/6, 1/6, 1/9, 1/9, 2/9, 2/9) are equal to odds 
w.r.t. TT, and thus, n is not uniquely defined. In fact, any prior 
of the form (n1 , n1 , n2 , n2 , n3, n3) where 
TT2 + TT3 
= 2 and TTl + TT2 + TT3 = 1/2 
TTl 
will produce the above odds. 
2.4 Finite X and ® Spaces With Infinite Odds. 
In this section Theorem 2.2 is strengthened to include infinite 
odds. To avoid infinite values in the payoff function, we use a 
convention from Freedman and Purves (1969). If for any x e X and 
A ea l{x, A)= oo, then Paul can ask for any M{x, A) where 
0 S M{x, A)< 00 provided a e A and s{x, A)> o. That is, if 
l(x, A)= oo, then Paul gains 
(2.11) M{x, A) if s{x, A)> 0 and 9 e A 
0 if s{x, A)= O a~d 6 e A 
-s(x, A) if a e A 
where M{x, A) is predetennined by Paul as part of his strategy s. 
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we will also restrict Paul to non-negative stakes whenever l{x, A)= oo. ~ 
Definition 2.5. 
Paul's stakes s satisfies Restriction P if s{x, A)> 0 whenever 
l{x, A) = oo. 
If A justification for assuming Restriction Pis the following. 
the event 9 e A given x is impossible and 9 e A given x is 
sure, then the odds l(x, A)= oo and l(x, A)= 0 are consistent 
with probabilities P(0 e Alx) = O and P(0 e Alx) = 1. Any amount 
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that Paul bets on A he is sure to lose. Thus, if Paul is allowed 
to bet a negative stake on A, he guarantees a positive expected 
payoff. This would not be fair to Peter! 
Our pursuit of a result similar to Theorem 2.2 for infinite odds 
can take two courses. One of these modifies the definition of strict 
coherence to include the closure of the space of all expected payoffs 
as Paul varies s against a fixed A. That is, alter strict coherence 
to mean that the closure of the space of payoffs contains no semi-
positive vector. The new definition would not affect the re·sult of 
Theorem 2.2 since the space of payoffs under the assumptions is a 
hyperplane in RP. Since hyperplanes are closed, Theorem 2.2 would 
not change if we modified the definition of strict coherence. 
An alternate approach is to add the restriction that G is closed 
under complementation. After three easy lemmas, an extended result 
may be stated and proved. Since one of the purposes of this chapter 
is to acquaint the reader with the spirit of the material without 
complexity, we choose to present this method. Thus, for the remainder 
of this chapter we assume G is closed under complementation. 
Although the convention of Freedman and Purves (1969) avoids 
infinite terms in the formation of the expected payoff (2.3), it destroys 
the linearity of the space of expected payoffs. The net effect is that 
G1 (e) cannot be expressed as in (2.9). A procedure for skirting 
s -
this problem first shows, that if A is strictly coherent and A(x0 , A) = 
then p(xo, a) = 0 for all a € A. Next it shows, if A(x0 , A) = oo, 
then p(xo, a) = 0 for all 9 € A. Finally, the expected payoff is 
broken into two parts; one part comes from the finite odds and the 
- 15 -
0, 
other from the infinite odds. The infinite part is shown to be 
identically zero or semi-negative and combined with Theorem 2.2 to 
give the desired result. 
Lemma 2.1. 
Assume A is strictly coherent and s satisfies Restriction P. 
If A{x0 , A)= O, then 
(2.12) p{x0 , e) = o for all a e A. 
Proof: 
Let Paul specify s in which all the stakes are zero except 
(2.13) s (x0 , A) = -1. 
Then the expected payoff to Paul is 
A {p{x0 , 9) 0 e A (2.14) G (a)= 
s o a e A.~ 
Thus, if p(x0 , 9) > 0 for some 9 e A 
and the conclusion follows by contraposition. 0 
Lenuna 2.2. 
is semi-positive, 
Assume A is strictly coherent and s satisfies Restriction P. 
If A{x0 , A)= oo, then A(x0 , A)= o. 
Proof: 
Assume A{x0 , A)> O. Let Paul specify s with all elements zero 
except 
(2.15) s{xo, A) = ½; M{x0 , A)= (A(x0 , A) )-1 + 1 
s(x0 , A) = - )-1 (A(x0 , A) • 
A simple calculation shows 
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(2.16) 
Since p(x0 , 9) > 0 for some 
a e A 
a e: A. 
X 9 e: ®, G ( 9) 
s 
is semi-positive which 
is a contradiction to strict coherence. Thus 1(x0 , A)= O. D 
Lemma 2.3. 
Assume X is strictly coherent and s satisfies Restriction P. 
If 1{x0 , A)= oo, then 
(2.17) p(xo, e) = 0 
p(xo, a) > 0 
for all 9 e: A 
for some a e A. 
The proof follows directly from Lemmas 2.1 and 2.2. 
With these lemmas established we state and prove the necessary 
conditions for strict coherence. The technique in the proof breaks 
up the expected payoff into components which depend on finite and 
infinite odds. 
Theorem 2 • 3 • 
If X is strictly coherent and s satisfies Restriction P, then 
is proper Bayes w.r.t. TT> 0. 
- -
Proof: 
As in the proof of Theorem 2.2 we associate a matrix D containing 
colunm vectors formed from all the odds which are finite. Corresponding 
to infinite odds 1(x0 ,A0 ) = oo, let v(x0 , A0 , ~) be a vector with 
elements 
(2.18) M(x0 , A0)p(x0 , 9) if e e A0 and s(x0 , A0 )' > 0 
0 if a e: AO and s(x0 , A0 ) = 0 
-s(xo, A0 )p{x0 , 9) -if a e: AO. 
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Then the expected payoff can be written as 
(2.19) 
where the sum is taken over all xO and AO such that A{xO, AO) = oo. 
Since s satisfies Restriction P, by Lenuna 2.3 and {2.17) we see 
that v(xO, AO, 0)::: 0 
loss unless s{xO, AO) 
we have v{xO, AO, t) 
for all 0 es. Thus, Paul suffers needless 
= 0, and strict coherence implies that D!, 
cannot be semi-positive for any s. As in the proof of Theorem 2.2, 
there exists .!!> Q such that all finite odds are proper Bayes 
w.r.t. TT. If we adopt the usual definition R/O = oo where 
Re (0, oo), then by Lemma 2.3 and (2.6) the infinite odds are proper 
Bayes w.r.t. TT· D 
Theorem 2.4. 
If A is proper Bayes w.r.t. TT> 0 and s satisfies Restriction 
- -
P then 
(2.20) /JGA(9)TT(0) < 0 for all strategies 
9 s -
s, 
and thus, A is strictly coherent. 
Proof: 
As in the proof of Theorem 2.3 we have TT'D = O, where the columns 
- -
of D are formed from finite odds in A. If A(xO, AO) = 00 then 
(2.17) holds, and an easy computation shows r TT(0)•v{xO, AO, 0) < o. 
Since 
(2.21) 
where ~· denotes a sum over xO and AO such that A{xO, AO) = 00 , 
(2.20) follows. The remainder of the proof is clear. 0 
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This completes the extension of Theorem 2.2 as promised at the 
beginning of this section. When the results are phrased in terms of 
coherence, one can see that the presence of infinite odds only introduces 
mechanical difficulties that are a nuisance. On the other hand, if 
one is interested in characterizing the space of payoffs available to 
Paul, then the presence of infinite odds is relevant. That is, under 
assumptions of coherence and finite odds, the space of payoffs available 
to Paul is a hyperplane in RP. With infinite odds, the space of 
payoffs becomes a half space determined by a hyperplane which is no 
longer a linear space. Thus, the main mathematical inconvenience in 
dealing with infinite odds is the loss of the linear space of payoff 
functions. This concludes our treatment of finite sample and parameter 
space Peter-Paul games phased in terms of odds. 
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CHAPTER III 
Mathematical Background 
3.1 Introduction. 
Before proceeding to more complex sample and parameter spaces, 
we pause to present some mathematical theory which will facilitate 
the study of more general Peter-Paul games. The type of theory 
needed for countably infinite spaces is the existence of a positive 
vector which is orthogonal to a subspace containing no semi~positive 
vector. This represents an extension of Theorem 2.1, which applies 
to finite dimensional vector spaces. 
For normed linear spaces, such as iP, one approach in generalizing 
Theorem 2.1 might be to apply a separating hyperplane theorem such 
as Theorem 8 of Dunford and Schwartz (1958, p. 417). That is, if 
P is the set of all semi-positive vectors and M is a linear manifold 
such that Mn P =~'then a separating hyperplane theorem would 
show the existence of a non-zero continuous linear functional F 
such that F(M) = 0 and F(P) > O. Then we could utilize a repre-
sentation theorem of continuous linear functionals to get the desired 
results. There is a snag in the methodology, however, in that the 
hypothesis of separating hyperplane theorems require P to have 
a non-empty interior. Unfortunately P has an empty interior, and 
as a result, these theorems do not apply. 
The theory of this chapter solves the problem by using the fact 
that p is not only a convex set but a convex cone. We also assume 
that the distance between certain sequences of vectors in P and M 
does not go to zero (an exact statement of this is D.efinition 3.1). 
With these ideas we develop the desired result. 
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Section 3.2 focuses attention on a real normed linear space, 
say ~- The principal result of this section is the existence of 
a continuous linear functional separating disjoint sets M and N, 
where M is a manifold in ij and N is a convex cone in ij. 
Sections 3.3 and 3.4 specialize this to the normed linear spaces 
iP and LP where N is the set of semi-positive vectors or 
functions. The purpose of this development is to show that for linear 
manifolds which do not contain any semi-positive vector or function, 
there exists an orthogonal positive vector or function. Those who 
are not interested in th~ proof and development of such a result 
may find a formal statement of it in Theorem 3.5 (for tp) or 
Theorem 3.7 (for LP), and skip to the next chaper where we continue 
with Peter-Paul games. 
3.2 Separation Theorems for Real Normed Linear Spaces. 
Let 1' be a real normed linear space with norm given by IIYI\ 
for ye~- A subset Y c ~ is said to be a convex cone if Y is 
convex and aY c Y for all real a> O. Suppose N is a non-empty 
convex cone in 1', and M is a linear manifold in 1'· By applying 
the norm II •II we could state assumptions in terms of the closure 
of M or N. For instance, we could assume that N and the closure 
of M are disjoint (note M and the closure of N 
are disjoint only in trivial cases). However, in our study of convex 
cones and linear manifolds, we will need a slightly stronger 
assumption which is expressed in the next definition. 
Definition 3. 1. 
A non-empty convex cone N and a manifold M are said to have 
an empty expanded intersection [though n0 ] if for all n0e N (if for n0e N] 
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(3.1) inf inf \ln0 + n - mJI > 0 • 
meM neN · 
Equivalently d(N + n0 , M) > 0 where d denotes distance. 
Notice that if N and M have an empty expanded intersection, 
then the intersection <>f N and the closure of M is empty. This 
can be seen by taking the infimum over n in the inequality 
lln0 + n - mil :S lln0 - m\J + llnll. An empty expanded intersection also 
implies that {O) is not a member of N. Let K = M - N and· 
define a function g on y by 
(3.2) g(y) = inf Ilk - YII for all ye 1'· 
ke:K 
Lemma 3.1 shows g to be a sublinear functional on y. 
Lenuna. 3.1. 
Assume M is a linear manifold in 1', and N is a non-empty 
• 
• 
convex cone in 1' such that M and N have an empty expanded intersection 
through n0 • If g(x) is defined by (3.2) where K = M - N, then. 
g(x) has the following properties. 
(3.3) g(y) ?: 0 y e: y 
(3.4) g(k) = 0 for all k e K 
(3.5) g(O) = 0 
(3.6) g(y) + g(y')?: g(y+y') for y, y' € 1' 
(3.7) g(ay) = ag(y) for a ?: o, y e 1' 
(3.8a) g{n)?: 0 for all n e N 
(3.8b) g(no) > o. 
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Proof ( 3. 5) • 
Assume g( 0) = e > 0 and choose n e: N such that llnJI < €/2. 
However, -n is in K and 
(3.9) Ila + nll < e/2 . 
Now, (3.9) contradicts g(O) = e. Hence g(O) = O. 
Proof ( 3 .6). 
Case 1. ye K, y' e: K. 
Since y and y' are in K, 
(3.10) y = m - n where me M, n € N 
and 
(3.11) y' =t, m' - n' where m' e: M, n' e: N. 
This imp lies 
(3.12) y + y' = m + m' - n - n' = m" - n" where m" e M, n" e: N. 
Hence, since y + y' e K by (3.4) we have 
(3.13) g(y) + g(y') = 0 = g(y + y'). 
Case 2. y ~ K, y' e K and y + y' c K. 
Since y' + k e K when k e K, we have 
(3.14) g(y + y') = inf IIY + y' - kl! 
keK 
(3.15) < inf IIY + y' - k'II 
- k'=y'+k 
keK 
(3. 16) = inf IIY - kl\ 
keK 
(3.17) = g(y). 
Since g(y') = O, (3.4) and (3.14) through (3.17) imply (3.6). 
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Case 3. y c K, y' f K and y + y' + K. 
(3.18) 
(3.19) 
For each k' e K we have 
inf IIY + y' - k II ~ inf Jly + y' - k"II 
ke:K k"=k'+k 
keK 
~ IIY - k'II + inf IIY' - kll 
keK 
which imp 1 ies 
(3.20) g(y + y') ~ IIY - k'II + g(y' ). 
Taking the inf over k' e K in (3.20) gives (3.6). The remaining 
cases are trivial since y + y' e K. This completes the proof o·f (3.6). 
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Proof (3.7). LJ 
Case 1. y = 0 or a= o. 
In this case we have <YY = o. By (3.5) we have 
{3.21) ag(y) = g(CYY) = O. 
Case 2. ye K a> O. 
Since <YY e K, (3.4) implies {3.21). 
Case 3. y c K a> O. 
(3.22) 
(3.23) 
Since <YY ~ K we have 
g(<YY) = inf ll<YY - kll = inf ll<YY - akll 
keK keK 
= a inf IIY - kll = ag{y) • 
keK 
This completes the proof of (3.7). 
Proof (3.8b). 
For every k e K we have 
(3.24) 
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for some me: M and n e N. Taking the infimum over n e N gives 
(3.25) lln0 - kll ~ inf lln0 + n - mil, 
neN 
and taking the infimum over me M in (3.25) further implies 
(3.26) \jn0 - kll ~ inf inf lln0 + n - mll • 
me:M neN 
Since (3.26) is true for every k e: K, we have 
(3.27) inf lln0 - kll ~ inf inf lln0 - m + nil, ke:K meM neN 
and the right hand side of (3.27) is greater than zero since the 
expanded intersection of M and N through n0 is empty. D 
For the sake of completeness we present Theorem 3.1 and Lemma 
3.2 from Dunford and Schwartz (1958). Theorem 3.1 is connnonly 
referred to as the Hahn-Banach Theorem. 
Theorem 3.1. (Dunford and Schwartz, p. 62). 
Let the real function p on the real linear space Y satisfy 
(3.28) p(x + y) ~ p{x) + p(y), p(czy) = ap(y) for ~ ~ 0, x, y € Y. 
Let f be a real linear functional on a subspace S of Y with 
(3.29) f{y) ~ p(y) yes. 
Then there is a real linear functional F on Y for which 
(3.30) F(y) = f{y) for yes; F(y) ~ p(y) for ye Y. 
Definition 3.2. {Ibid., p. 411). 
If Y is a vector space, and S and T are subsets of Y, 
a functional f on Y is said to separate S and T if there 
exists a real constant c with f(S) > c and f(T) < c where 
f(S) = {x:x = f(s) for some s e S). 
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") 
Lemma 3.2. (Ibid., p. 412). 
The linear functional f separates the subsets S and T 
of Y if and only if it separates the subsets S - T and {O} of Y. 
Lennnas 3.1 and 3.2 will be combined with the Hahn-Banach Theorem 
to prove the existence of a linear functional which separates the 
previously defined subsets M and N. Theorem 3.2 is similar to 
separating theorems such as Theorem 8 of Dunford and Schwartz (1958) 
which involves the separation of two disjoint convex sets--one of 
which has a non-empty interior. Theorem 3.2, however, does not 
require that either of the sets have a non-empty interior, but rather 
that a non-empty conveJc cone has an empty expanded intersection with 
a linear manifold. 
Theorem J.2. {Basic Separation Theorem). 
Assume M is a linear manifold contained in ~, and N is a 
non-empty convex cone in ~ such that the expanded intersection of 
M and N through n0 is empty. Then there exists a non-zero 
linear functional F on ~ such that 
(3.31) F{n0 ) > o 
(3.32) F(n) >O for all 
(3.33) F(m) = 0 for all 
Proof: 
Let 
(3.34) f 0 (an0 ) = { g(ano) 
-g(-an0 ) 
where g is defined in (3.2). 
n e N 
m e M. 
if a> 0 
if a< 0 
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Let H be the subspace consisting of real multiples of n0 • 
Then f 0 is defined on H, and we will show that f 0 is a linear 
functional on H. 
_c_as_e_l_._n_. _=_a_no _w_h_e_r_e_a_~_o. 
If a> O then 
(3.35) 
If a< 0. then 
(3.36) 
Case 2. n = an0 where a < o. 
(3.37) 
(3.38) 
(3.39) 
and 
(3.40) 
If a> 0 then 
If a< 0 then 
Thus £0 (an) = af0 (n) for all real a and n e H. 
Let and n' I = a no. Then 
n + n' =(a+ a')n0 
f 0 (n) + £0(n') = f 0(an0 ) + £0(a'n0 ) = af0(n0 ) + a'f0 (n0 ) 
=(a+ a')fo(no) = fo(n + n'). 
Thus f0 is a linear functional defined on H which is a one-
dimensional subspace of ~ consisting of real multiples of n0 • 
Moreover, f0 (n) :=: g(n) for all n e H. Thus the conditions of 
Theorem 3.1 are satisfied; hence, there exists a real linear functional 
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F on 
" 
such that 
(3.41) F(n) = f 0{n) for n e H 
(3.42) F{y) ~ g(y) for Y e 1'· 
Thus, for K=M-N 
(3.43) F(K) ~ 0 
and 
(3.44) F(O) = O. 
Since F separates M - N and zero, by Lennna 3.2 F separates 
M and N. {3.33) follows since M is a subspace. (3.8b) implies 
g(n0) > 0, and (3.34) and (3.41) show F{n0) > O; thus {3.31) holds. 
By combining the separation of M and N with (3.44) and (3.31), 
(3.32) follows. D 
Theorem 3.2 proves the existence of a linear functional which 
separates M and N. However, we need a continuous linear functional 
which separates M and N. The next theorem shows the existence 
of a continuous linear functional with the desired properties. 
Theorem 3.3. 
A necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of a 
non-zero continuous linear functional F satisfying (3.31) through 
, 
{3.33) is that M and N have an empty expanded intersection through n0 • 
Proof: 
The Basic Separation Theorem proves the existence of F satisfying 
{3.31), (3.32), and (3.33). We shall show F to be continuous at 
zero. First, we get bounds on F in terms of g as defined by (3.2). 
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(3.45) 
{3.42) implies 
F(-y) ~ g(-y), 
and with the homogeneity of F, we have 
(3.46) IF(y)I ~ max{g{y), g(-y)) for ye~. 
But for ye ij we have 
(3.47) g(y) ~ IIYII + inf llkll = IIYII • 
keK 
·-ml Combining {3.46) and (3.47) gives 
(3.48) IF(y) I ~ IIYII for all y e 1'· 
Thus, for e: > 0, IF(y) - F(O) I = IF(y) I < e whenever IIYII ~ e/2, 
and so F is continuous at zero. By Lemma II.l.3 of Dunford and 
Schwartz (1958), F is continuous. D 
To show necessity assume 
(3.49) inf lln0 + n - mil = o. 
n,m 
By (3.31) to (3.33) and the linearity of F, for all n, m we have 
(3.50) 
This contradicts the continuity of F since F(O) = 0, and thus 
(3.49) cannot hold. D 
The preceding theorem guarantees the existence of a continuous 
linear functional which separates M and N. If N has a countable 
base it will be useful to know that there exists a continuous linear 
functional such that F(M) = 0 and F(N) > O, i.e., F strictly 
separates M and N. This is the goal of the next theorem. 
Theorem 3.4. 
Assume M is a linear manifold contained in ~' and N is a 
non-empty convex cone in U• Assume N has a countable base 
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{e.) 
1. 
(that is, there exists a sequence {ei) where ei e N such that 
00 
for all n e N, n = 'E c.e. for some ci ~ 0 for i = 1,2, ••• ). 
. 1 1. 1. l.= 
The expanded intersection of M and N is empty if and only.if (iff) 
there exists a continuous linear functional F such that 
(3.51) 
(3.52) 
Proof: 
F{n) > O for all n e N 
F{m) = 0 for all me M. 
By repeatedly applying Theoran 3.3 there exists a sequence {F. )~ 1 
1. l.= 
of non-zero continuous linear functionals on 1' such that for each 
i = 1,2,3, ••• 
(3.53) 
(3.54) 
(3.55) 
The 
(3.56) 
F.{e.)>O 
1. 1. 
F. (n) >O for all n e N 
1. 
F.{m)=O for all me M. 
1. 
norm· of F. is defined by 
1. 
sup IF. {y) I , 
IIYll~l ;yeij 1. 
and since F. is continuous, by Theorem 3.1A of Taylor (1961, p. 85), 
1. 
IIF ill is finite. Thus, without loss of generality we can assume 
(3.57) 
Furthermore, F. is a member of the Banach space of all continuous 
l. 
linear operators on lJ into the real line {see Dunford and Schwartz 
(1958, p. 61, Lemma 8)). Notice 
00 00 
(3.58) 6 IIFill = ~ 
i=l i=l 
l/i2 < oo, 
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and thus by Theorem 3.13-c of Taylor (1961, p. 100), F defined by 
(3.59) 
00 
F = ~ F. 
i=l l. 
is a continuous linear functional on ij. Clearly (3.51) and ('3.52) 
hold for this F. Necessity follows as in the previous proof. D 
This concludes our development of theorems which hold for real 
normed linear spaces. Next we specialize this to 
3.3 Separation Theorems for 1,P Space. 
spaces. 
For p e [1, oo) let tP be the set of infinite sequences v such 
00 
that The norm for is given by 
(3.60) 
00 
L will denote the set of infinite sequences v such that sup Iv. I 
l. 
00 is finite. The norm for t is 
(3.61) sup I"· I 
i=l, 2, • • • 1. 
00 
vet. 
tp spaces are normed linear spaces (see Taylor (1961)), and thus, 
the theory of Section 3.2 applies. In this section, attention is 
focused on the form of a continuous linear functional which separates 
the set of all semi-positive vectors from a linear manifold in a 
tp space, under the assumption that the linear manifold has an empty 
expanded intersection with the semi-positive vectors. First, we 
consider a result which follows as a -~corollary to Theorem 3.4. 
Corollary 3 .1. 
Let M be a linear manifold in t 4 , q e [1, oo] and let P 
be the set of all semi-positive vectors in tq. The expanded 
intersection of M and P is empty iff there exists a continuous 
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linear functional F such that 
(3.62) 
(3.63) 
Proof: 
F(m) = 0 
F(p) > 0 
for all me M 
for all p e P. 
Clearly p is a non-empty convex cone. Let ei be the vector 
with i th element equal to one with all other elements zero. Thus 
for any p e P, p = E p.e. 
l. 1. 
and p. > O. 
1. -
Now apply Theorem 3.4. 0 
Next, we consider the representation of F on iP. First, we 
examine the case when p e [1, oo), and then p = co. 
Definition 3.3. 
< y, y' > will denote the inner product between ye iP and 
y' e tq where p and q are determined by 
= f (p-1) if p e: (1, oo) (3.64) q if p = co 
if p = 1 • 
By Itolder's inequality (see Royden (1963), p. 97) < y, y' > is well 
defined and finite for ye iP and y' e tq. Theorem 3.5 is a 
version of Theorem 3.4 for 1P spaces where the convex cone is either 
the set of all semi-positive or positive vectors. 
1 
' 
w 
!., 
w 
, I 
~ 
I 
J.J 
-. 
, I 
w 
I I 
I 
Theorem 3.5. w 
Let M be a linear manifold in 1P where p e [1, co), and 
let P be the set of all semi-positive [positive] vectors in iP. 
The expanded intersection of P and M is empty iff there 
exists a vector v e lq, where q is defined by (3.64), such that 
" > 0 [" ~ O] and < "' m > = 0 for all m e M. (" > O [" ~ O] 
denotes that v is semi-positive [positive].) 
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Proof: 
Assume P is the set of all semi-positive vectors. From 
Corollary 3.1 there exists a continuous linear function F such 
that (3.62) and (3.63) hold. By Theorem 4.32-A of Taylor (1961, 
p. 194), there exists v e Lq such that 
(3.65) F{x) = < v, x > for all x e tP. 
Now e. e P and so by (3.63) and (3.65) 
l. 
(].66) < v, e. > 
l. 
> 0 
which implies v. > O. This holds for all i = 1,2, ••• 
l. 
and so 
v > O. < v, m > = 0 for all me M as a consequence of (3.62) and 
(3.65). This completes the proof when P is the set of semi-
positive vectors. 
Next, assume P is the set of positive vectors. As above we 
represent a continuous linear functional F, for which (3.62) and 
(3.63) holds, as an inner product with v. Now e. 
l. 
is in the 
closure of P, and so by combining the continuity of F with (3.63), 
we see that < v, e. > is greater than or equal to zero. This holds 
l. 
for all i = 1,2, ••• , and thus v > O. The necessity is clear. D 
Theorem 3.6. 
00 
Let M be a linear manifold in L and P be the set of all 
semi-positive [positive] vectors in 00 L • Let J denote the set 
of all positive integers. The expanded intersection of P and 
M is empty iff there exists a boun4ed finitely additive set function 
µ defined on J such that 
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J m.µ{dj) = 0 for all {m1 , m2 , ••• ) e M J J . 
µ(j) > 0 [~(j) ~ 0] for all j e J. 
Proof: 
By Corollary 3.1 there exists a continuous linear functional 
F such that (3.62) and (3.63) hold. By applying Corollary 3 of 
Dunford and Schwartz (1958, p. 259), we have 
(3.68) F{v) = J v.µ(dj) 
J J 
00 
" e l 
where ~ is a bounded finitely additive set function on J. By 
(3.63) and (3.68) we have µ{i) = F{ei) > 0. Applying (3.68) to 
(3.62) completes the proof when P is the set of semi-positive 
vectors. For the positive vectors, use a proof similar to the second 
part of the proof of Theorem 3.5. D 
To see the result of weakening the empty expanded intersection 
assumption to P n M = cp where M is. the closure of M in Jl, 
let us consider the next example. 
Example 2. 1. 
Let M be spanned by the vectors 
m1 = (1, 1, -1/2, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, ••• ) 
~ = {o, o, 1/2, 1, -1/3, o, o, o, ••• ) 
m3 = (o, o, 0, o, 1/3, 1, -1/4, 0, •.• ) 
etc. Clearly Mc t 1 and M contains no semi-positive vector; 
furthermore, neither does the closure of M and Mn P = ~- we see 
that an orthogonal vector is (1, 0, 2, 0, 3, etc.) which is not in 
00 
t nor is it positive. 
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~ 
•·, ... 
s+(x) = I[O, M](s(x)) • s(x)/M ll-
.... 
s _ ( x ) = - I [ _ M, O] ( s ( x) ) • s ( x) /M • 
For ~ defined in Lemma 6.1 we have ... 
(6.27) M-l G:(e) = J ~(x, 8) s+(x) f(x, a) dµ(x) la.I 
- J ~ ( x , 8 ) s _ ;( x) f ( x , 8 ) dµ. ( x) 
= I(o, 11 (~(s+))• (P(s+)c. 8- a) 
~ 
- I[-l, O)(E8(s -)) • (p{s->c_ 9_ a). i-1 
Since M, E9(s+), and/or E8(s-) are positive for a non-trivial a, strict ... 
coherence implies s3(a) a.e. [A]. On the other hand even if c is s3(a) a.e. 
[l], this does not imply that the linear combination (6.27) could not be semi- i..i 
positive for some s+ ands-. Thus,strict coherence is stronger than s3(a)a.e.[A~ 
It is interesting to note that the proof of Theorem 1 of Wallace 
only shows that if c is proper Bayes w.r.t. n > O, then c is 
s
3
(a) a.e. [A] and not s3(~) as is claimed. Our Theorem 6.1 is 
somewhat like a converse to Theorem 1 or Wallace. 
Irrespective of a.e. considerations it is easily seen that weak 
coherenc~ implies s0 , s1 , and s2 • We close this chapter with a 
quote from Wallace. 
Buehler's examples, combined with the examples and 
results of this paper, seem to indicate the need for properties 
intermediate to advance probability and strong advance pro-
bability, and even suggest that strong advance probability 
may be so strong and rare as to be of little value. 
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in terms of payoff functions since they form a linear vector 
space for sup-bounded stake functions. Suppose we let 
v(e, s) = P (s)(c ) - a. Then we note that kV(8, s) is not equal 
a •a 
to v(e, ks) for all choices of real k because v(e, ks) is not 
defined for k < O or for ks> 1. Thus, the set v(e, s) does not 
form a linear vector space, and this limits the scope of mathematics 
that applies. 
At first s3 and strict coherence appear equivalent since they 
both have the flavor of avoiding semi-positive payoffs. Likewise 
one might consider the selection of Wallace as a generalization of the 
pure strategies of Buehler. However, both Buehler's and our scheme 
allow Paul the opportunity to bet on or against the confidence interval 
at odds proportional to the confidence level. In contrast, Wallace's 
selection only allows Paul to vary the amount bet on the confidence 
interval. Intuitively, this means that if the odds are too low, an 
expected payoff w~ll never become positive just by varying the amount 
of a positive stake. Let us study the relationship between and 
strict coherence in detail. 
Suppose we modify the definition of s3(a) as follows. 
(viii)' • C has property S3'a) a.e. [k] if, for every selection 
stake function s for which G~(8) S 0 for all a or else G:(e) 2: 0 
for all a, equality holds a.e. [A ] • 
For an arbitrary stake function s with sup-bound M, define 
two selection stake functions as 
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f . ~-
.... --
O :s; sup 
8e8 
G~ (8). 
{vi). c has property s1(a) if, for every selection stake functions 
inf G~ ( 8 ) S O ~ sup 
8eS 8e® 
Ge (8) • 
s ' 
(vii). c has property s2(a) if, for every selection stake function 
s, · there exists parameter values e1 , e2 , such that 
c: ( e 1 ) s o s G: ( e 2 ) • 
(viii). c has property s3 (a) if, for every select ion stake func-
tion s for which Gc(e) < 0 for all 8 or else Gc(e) > O for all 
s - s -
e, equality holds for all e. 
It is known that exact confidence is equivalent to weak exactness, 
and earlier in this section we discussed the equivalent of weak exact-
ness in Peter-Paul games. If a weakly coherent confidence procedure 
c is weakly exact, then it will have the property of advance probability. 
It is conjectured that a continuous version of Example 5.3 would give 
a c having advance probability. 
-Since Wallace only considers selections for which E9(s) > 0, 
C > . (s) > by (6.25) we see that G (8) = O is equivalent to P8 (c 8 ) = a s < • < 
respectively. This fact was used in presenting our translated versions 
of properties s0 , s1 , s2 and s3 • Thus, if one's concern is the 
semi-positiveness of P (s)(c 8 ) - a, it is equivalent to consider . s • 
either betting a fixed amount, say one dollar, with probability s(x) 
(s(x) s[O, 1 ]) or placing a bet of s(x) dollars with probability 
one. 
- 84 -
y 
.... 
.... 
.... 
~ 
I.I 
.. 
-
... 
... 
.. 
~ 
1-i 
Ii.I 
... 
.. 
.. 
... 
111111 
... 
...,_ 
~ 
J 
i 
I 
... 
-
... 
... 
~ 
-
.... 
..i 
... 
~ 
I 
I 
..i 
I 
I 
'-' 
~ 
I 
w 
-.i 
-.I 
.. -
Then if E0 (s) > O, we have 
(6.25) G~(e )/E8 (8) = J [Ic (e) - ~(x)] s(x) f(x, e) dµ,(x)/E8(s) X• 
= J IC (e) f(s){x, 8) dµ{x) - a J f(s)(x, e) dµ(x) 
where 
(6.26) 
and p (s) e 
x• 
_ P (s)(c ) - a 
- e •8 
f(s)(x, 9) = f(x, 9) s(x)/E8 (s) 
denotes probability w.r.t. f(s)(x, e). 
Now we can translate several of his performanc~ properties of a 
confidence procedure c assuming a(x) = a. 
( i). c has property c(a), called exact confidence a, , if for 
all 9 e ®, Gc(e) = O whenever 
s 
s{x) = 1. 
(ii). c has property c(a) called lower confidence a if for 
s(x) = 1 we have 
inf 
0 e ® 
Gc(0)=0. 
s 
(iii). C has property c(a) called upper confidence Q' if for 
s(x) a 1 
sup Gc(e) = o. 
9 e (8) 8 
(iv). c has advance probability a if it has exact confidence 
a, and if, for any selection stake function for which Gc(9) = q 
s 
for 
all a ·e (8), q = o. 
(v). c has property sO(a) if, for every selection stake function s 
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We observe that the rule R is equivalent to C, the u to 
e, and Paul bets consistently that A is false by letting s(x) 
-
-1. 
Thus the translation: ·c is weakly exact if Gc(e) = 0 whenever 
s 
s(x) is either identically plus or minus one and o-(x) = a. As 
Buehler points out, weak exactness is equivalent to writing P9(c. 9} = a 
for all e. This follows by rewriting the expected payoff (6.4). 
We translate his concept of semirelevant and relevant subsets. 
Let e > O be independent of e. Then a pure stake function induces 
(by 6.23) subsets which are called 
(6.24) semirelevant ! if Gc(0) > 0 s 
or if Gc(e) < 0 
s 
for all e 
relevant! if G:(a) ~ s 
or if Gc(e) < -e 
s -
for all 8 
If we considered (6.24) to hold a.e. [A) instead of for all e, 
then semirelevant subsets would be tantamount to pure stake functions 
with positive expected payoffs. Irrespective of a.e. considerations, 
by (6.24) and Definition 6.3, weak coherence (and hence strict coherence) 
implies there exists no semirelevant subsets. This follows since weak 
coherence requires that in the class of all sup-bounded strategies of 
Paul {not only pure ones), there exists no positve payoff. In this 
thesis we have not studied a counter-part to relevant subsets. 
In the same year Wallace (1959) addressed a similar topic. To 
establish the relation between his paper and ours, suppose a(x) = a 
for a e (0, 1) and consider stake functions s which are bounded 
by zero and one. : We will call such an s a selection stake function. 
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Although our model comes from Buehler, our concept of coherence 
stems from a generalization of Cornfield (1969) and Freedman and 
Purves (1969). As previously discussed, they apply a Peter-Paul game 
to finite discrete sample and parameter spaces where Peter is required 
to state his odds or probabilities of all possible subsets of the para-
meter space for a given sample observation. In Cornfield's discrete 
model, coherence implies that Paul can nota~hieve a semi-positive payoff. 
Thus, our definition of coherence for the confidence interval model is 
both a generalization (from discrete to continuous spaces) and a 
restriction (from all possible subsets· to one) of Cornfield (1969). 
Let us examine the similarities between coherence and Buehler's criteria. 
Suppose we restrict Paul to stake functions (referred to as pure) 
which take values of either -1, 0, or +l for each x. The sets C+ 
and C of Buehler are 
(6.23) C+ = [x: s(x) = 1} and· C- = (x: s(x) = -1}. 
He considers an expected gain to Paul; by inspecting (6.4) we see that 
it corresponds to for pure stake functions where ?eter's 
strategy c determines the event A in a probability assertion for 
each x. Buehler proposed a criterion of weak exactness as: 
If the mcxlel is adequately specified, one should in 
pr-inciple be able to calculate the expected gain to Paul. 
For any fixed experimental conditions K the expected gain 
would be a function of (i) the state of nature U, (ii) 
Peter's rule R, and (iii) Paul's strategy s. Different 
criteria for the sensibility of Peter's rule might be put 
forward in terms of this expected gain. For example, I 
propose the following. Suppose Paul's strategy is to bet 
consistently that A is false, regardless of the observa-
tions. Thenif Paul's expected gain is zero for all U, 
Peter's rule R will be defined to be weakly exact. 
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class (p), and that c is {q) weak Bayes w.r.t. rr > O [rr ~-o]. If 
either 
(6 .-20) 
(6.21) 
or 
{ a(x)[l - a(x)] i f(x, 8) n(8) cl). (8) dµ.(x) < ... , 
J a(x)[l - a(x)] 11 f(x, ~) llp dµ,(x) < m, 
X 
. -
(6.22) ! (Jla(x) f(x ,a W cl). (a) + JI [1-a(x)] f (x ,a W cl>. (a)} l/p dµ.(x) < "' 
etc eec 
x• r 
holds, then c is strictly [weakly]coherent. 
The above sufficient conditions are rather inadequate because they 
fail to hold whenever a(x) = 6 (0 < 6 < 1) and rr e Lq where q > 1. 
These sufficient conditions are all aimed at showing rr is orthogonal 
..i 
~ 
... 
..., 
'-I 
6-il 
.... 
to qc which implies coherence. There may be other ways to demonstrate ._. 
coherence, such as a continuous version of Example 5.3. 
as an open question. 
6.5 Comparison with Other Models. 
We leave this 
Buehler (1959) and Wallace (1959) introduced papers dealing with 
the conditional confidence levels of confidence procedures. This 
section discusses the relationship between the above papers and our 
confidence interval model. A correspondence is made between Buehler's 
semirelevant subsets, stake functions, and Wallace's concept of selection. 
We have fashioned our model after one proposed by Buehler (1959) 
where, in a continuous sample and parameter space, testing the validity 
of confidence intervals takes the form of a game between two players. 
We will see that some of the criteria that Buehler proposes have direct 
counterparts in our model while others do not. 
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• 6.4 Sufficient Conditions for Coherent Bayes. 
Unfortunately necessary and sufficient conditions for Bayesian 
strategies to be coherent have not yet been established. From the 
previous section we know that coherence for class (p) densities 
implies a Bayes' solution based on a prior in Lq. In this section 
we will state theorems which provide sufficient conditions for some 
Bayes' solutions to be coherent. Most of these results are analogous 
to those of Chapter V for discrete spaces, and since the proofs are 
similar, they will be omitted. The first lemma states that whenever 
TT is orthogonal to 
is satisfied. 
Lemma 6.3. 
sJ.c 
p' the empty expanded intersection condition 
Assume there exists TT e Lq such that TT> 0 [n 2: O], and rr 
is orthogonal to Then the expanded intersection of and 
is empty where P is the set of semi-positive [positive] functions 
in LP. 
In particular for a class (p) density, TT is orthogonal to lie 
p 
p 
whenever c is (q) weak Bayes w.r.t. TT, and we have the next result. 
Theorem 6.3. 
If c is proper Bayes w.r.t. n > 0 [rr ~ O], then c is strictly 
[weakly] coherent. 
By combining continuous analogues of Lemma 5.2 and 5.3, and 
Theorems 5.2 and 5.3, we have a series of sufficient conditions for 
coherence of (p) weak Bayes' strategies • 
Theorem 6.4. 
Assume the density of the confidence interval specification is 
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Proof: 
{q) weak Bayes w.r.t. 1T follow~ by applying Theorem 3.7 as in 
the previous proof. To see that (6.12) must be well defined on a set 
of x with positive µ, measure, let A ={x:Jfn~>O}. 1T . Since 
f TT 2=_ 0, by the Iterated Integrals Theorem of Loeve (1955, p. 136) 
we have 
(6 .18) J J f 1T ~ d!J, = J 1T J f dµ, ~ = J TT ~ > 0 • 
This implies µ.(A ) can not be zero. 
1T 
To study the cases when p ==,consider the next definition. 
Definition 6.6. 
Let TT be a bounded finitely additive set function on B. 
c is said to be BA Bayes w.r.t. rr if n(B) ~ 0 for all Be B, 
and 
(6 .19) J f{x, 0) rr(d8) = Q'(X) r f(x, 8) TT(d8) a.e. [µ,]. 
C ~ 
x• 
By applying Theorem 3.10 in a way similar to the proof of Theorem 
6.1, one could prove an analogous result for class{=) densities pro-
vided (6.16) is true. Previously (6.16) held since the interchange 
of the order of integration was with respect to two a-additive measures, 
~ and A· Now the interchange would involve a a-additive measure 
µ, and a finitely additive set function n, and the validity of 
(6.16) is in question. We leave the verification of (6.16) as an open 
question and state the analogous result as a conjecture. 
Conjecture: 
Assume the f in the specification is a tractable class (m) 
density. If c is strictly coherent, then c is BA Bayes. 
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to (6.15) allows the interchange of the order of summation giving 
(6.16) ~ rr(8) l r;(x, 8) f(x, 8) dµ.(x) ~(8) 
= l i g (x, 0) f(x, 0) rr(8) ~(8) dµ.(x) 
Since TT is orthogonal to C lip, the left hand side of (6.16), and hence, 
the right hand side equals zero. This occurs for ill measurable sets 
Ac A .. , and thus we conclude that 
l.J 
(6.17) 
a.e. [µJ 
i g (x, 8) f (x, 8) rr(8) ~ (8) = o 
where µ is restricted to A ..• 
1J 
Note that TT does not depend on A •• so that (6.17) holds a.e.[~] l.J 
for all A •• , i 1.J = 1, 2, ••. ;j= 1, 2, ••• Since X =6 A .. we conclude (6.17) l.J 
holds a.e.[µ,]. Clearly (6.17) can be rewritten as (6.12) which implies 
is (q) weak Bayes w.r.t. TT• 
Define B' by i Because of (6.14), A(Bi) 
is greater than zero for all i. The B1 have been chosen so that for 
C 
each x there exists some i such that f(x, e) > 0 for all 9 in B .• 
J. 
Thus for x e Bi_,iftr~ ~ {i fndA. > O, and (6.12) is well defined. 
As you can see, the last part of the proof assures us that {6.12) 
is well defined when c is strictly coherent and f is a tractable density. 
In countable spaces we noted that an equation analogous to (6.12) need not 
be well defined for all x when a was required to be only weakly coherent. 
This is also true in continuous spaces, and as a result, the restriction of 
tractability can be dropped from the hypothesis for weakly coherent c• 
Theorem 6.2. 
For p e [ 1, m] assume that the f in the spec·ification is a class 
(p) density. If c is weakly coherent, it is (q) weak Bayes w.r.t. 
TT• Equation (6.12) holds non-trivially on a set of positive µ, measure. 
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by a wide class of densities commonly: occurring in statistical inference. 
We state a theorem for these densities. 
Theorem 6.1. 
For p e (1, =] assume that the f in the specification is a 
tractable class (p) density. If c is strictly coherent then c 
is (q) weak Bayes w.r.t. TT where q is determined by (5.1). 
Furthermore,equation (6.12) holds non-trivially, i.e. J fndA > 0 
for each x. 
Proof: 
and (B.} 
l. 
be· sequences of sets such that (6.5.ii) 
and (6.13) hold respectively. Strict coherence requires and 
the set of semi-positive functions in LP to have an empty expanded 
interpection. Thus· by Theorem 3.8 there exists a semi-positive function 
TT 
(6 .14) 
such that TT is orthogonal to ~c and p 
< TT, IB. > > 0 
]. 
for all i. 
By Lemma 6.2 
and (6.10) holds. 
there exists a sequence (D.} 
l. 
such that 
Let A. . = A. n D .• l.J ]. J For a fixed i and j 
A be any measurable subset of 
corresponding to A by 
1 X € A 
A •. , ~nd define a stake function l.J 
0 elsewhere. 
By Lemma 6.1 the expected payoff function corresponding to 
let 
is 
in ~c. For ~ defined in the proof of Lemma 6.1, l~(x, e)I S 1, p 
and so by (6.10) we have 
(6 .15) J i I g{x, e)lf{x, e) rr(e) <tl.(8) dµ.{x) < ... 
AiJ 
D. 
l. 
Applying Tonelli's and Fubini's Theorems (see Royden (1963, p. 233-234)) 
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' One possible way in which Peter could choose c is to be consist 
with Bayesian posterior probabilities. Later we will see the merits 
of this type of choice. 
Definition 6 .4. 
For p e [1, =], c is said to be (p) weak Bayes w.r.t. TT if and 
only if there exists a function TT such that rr: ® ~ (0, ~], TT E:LP, and 
(6.12) J f(x, e) TT(e) dA(e) = a(x) J f(x, e) rr(e) dA(e) 
® C 
a.e.[µ.]. 
x• 
In discrete spaces we proved that strict coherence implied Peter's 
strategy to be consistent with Bayes' posterior probabilities for some 
strictly positive prior. Since the prior is positive, the posterior 
probabilties were well defined by equation (4.13). In continuous 
~paces we have been unable to show the existence of an a.e.[A] positive 
function which is orthogonal to a linear space containing no semi-
positive function. If the prior is only semi-positive, then for an 
arbitrary density f(x, 8) the integral J fndA may be zero for some 
x, and then (6.12) will not uniquely define a(x). To circumvent 
this problem we consider a very mild restriction on the density. 
Definition 6. 5. 
A density f(x, e) is said to be tractable if there exists a 
disjoint decomposition of ® into sets 
X € X 
B. e fi such tlB t for each 
]. 
( 6 .13) {a: f(x, 9) > o}:::, B. for some i. 
]. 
Note that discrete type (p) p.m.f.'s of the previous chapters 
have the properties of class (p) and tractability. These properties 
appear to be useful in studying the continuous cases and are satisfied 
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then there exists a sequence (Di} which depends on 1T such that 
00 
(6 .9) X=~ D. 
i=l l. 
and 
(6.10) l:. J f(x, 8) 1T(8) d·.A(8) d µ,(x)< 00 for all i. 
l. ® 
Proof: 
If W(x) = ~ f(x, 8) 1T(8) d A(8), then H"older's inequality 
assures us that W(x) is we11· defined and finite for all x ex. Let 
I [ • D. = x: 1 
l 
1 S W(x) < i} for i = 1, 2, •••. Since µ, is a-finite, 
there exists a sequence such that 
00 
X =~D'.' 
i=l]. 
for 
each i. Define D~j =Din Dj for 
0 
i=l,2, ••• 
and 
and j = 1, 2, .•. 
and reorder (Dij} into a sequence 
since for every Di there corresponds a 
Clearly (6.9) holds, and 
0 D .. such that 
l.J 
(6 .11) J J f(x, e) 1T(e) 
0 
Dij ® 
then (6.10) follows. Cl 
<D.(8) dµ,(x) :s; J i dµ,(x) 
0 
Dij 
= i • µ,(n?.)<0:>, 1.J 
As in previous chapt~rs we study a property of the Confidence 
Interval Model. 
Definition 6. 3. 
For a fixed confidence interval specification, Peter's c is 
said to be strictly [weakly] coherent if and only if (i) qc contains 
, 
no semi-positive [positive] function, and (ii) the expanded intersection 
of ~c and the set of all semi-positive (positive] functions in LP p 
is empty. (A function g is said to be semi-positive if g~ O a.e.[A] 
and A [ g > 0} > 0. ) 
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' if p = co, · C C then l:ip = Q • 
The next lemma shows that l:ic is not empty, and later we will p 
c.: 
see that )JP cc;,ntains a rich enough set of payoff functions to be 
useful in proving Theo·rem 6 .1. Let us define the support, J ( s), of 
a stake function to be 
(6 .6) J(s) = (x: s(x) ¢ o}. 
Lemma 6.1. 
Let the density of a specification be of class (p) and suppose 
(A.} satisfies (6.5). Then Gc(e) is a member of LP for all 
]. s N 
stake functions s such that J(s)c6A . 
i=l]. 
for some N < co. 
Proof: 
Let g(x, e) = IC (e) - ~(x), and M be equal to the ess. sup 
x• 
of s (x). M is finite by the definition of a stake function. Then 
N 
for all x such that J (s )c 6 Ai we have 
i=l N 
(6.7) IG~(e)I = 1'.k g{x, a) s(x) f(x, a) dµ.{x)I SM• E {_ f{x, a) dµ.(x). 
]. 
Applying Minkowski's inequality (see Royden ·(1963, p. 95)) gives 
(6 .8) 
Thus 
N 
IIGC(e )II ~ M • 6 IIP(A. le )II < m. 
s p i=l ]. p 
is in LP, and so, )ic p is not empty. D 
In the proof of Th~orem 6.1 we will need a result which we find 
convenient to state and prove at this time. For the remainder of this 
chapter q equals p/(p - 1) if p e (1, co] or co if p = 1. 
Lemma 6.2. 
For some p e [1, co] assume that f(x, 9) e LP as a function 
of 8 for each x ex. If TT is a semi-positive function in Lq, 
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0 .... 
ranges over all !!!• sup-bounded stake functions s{x}. Note: 
Qc depends on f and a(x) as well as c; however, f and a 
are fixed in the specification. 
is a linear manifold in 00 L ' It is easy to verify that 
and as we focus attention on C Q we might suspect that different 
strategies {or confidence procedures} c, which Peter could use, will 
change the space of expected payoff functions. In general, this 
is true since Qc depends on c. Thus, how should Peter choose c? 
The next section investigates an aspect of the problem. 
6.3 Implications of Coherence with Class {p) Densities. 
In this section we will introduce a space of payoffs which depends 
on densities belonging to class (p) and use this space to study a 
property of Peter's strategy c called coherence. A density f{x, e) 
is said to belong to class (p) where p e (1, co] if it satisfies 
two conditions: 
(6.5) (i) f(x, e)e LP for each x e X 
rv 
(ii) there exists a sequence {Ai}~=l such that 
CD 
for all i and X =
1
~
1
Ai. 
This means that for a density f there is a decomposition of X into 
sets Ai which are "small enough" such that the LP norm of P(A1 I!) 
is finite. As in Chapter IV we consider a class of payoffs 
on class (p) densities. 
Definition 6.2. 
sf depending p 
If the density of a confidence interval specification is of class 
( ) then "'c p , ffp will denote the intersection of qc 
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' (6.2) ( 1-0'(x) )s(x) 
-a(x)s(x) 
if 9 e C X• 
if 9 J.. C f X• 
From the payoff we see that Paul is risking -Q'(x)s(x) to win 
(1-a(x))s(x) if 90 e C • In terms of odds, Peter offers Paul X• 
odds of (1-a(x))/a(x) against a e ex• (assuming a(x) > o). 
In usual betting terminology a{x)s{x) is the stake placed on 
9 e C ; however, it is usually convenient to refer to s{x) as 
X• 
the stake. 
The a measurability of a(x), IC (0) and s(x) imply the 
X• 
a measurability of v(x, e) where 
(6.3) v(x, 9) = [IC (8) - a{x)]s(x)f(x, 9). 
x• 
Assuming the integral to be well defined, an expected payoff or gain 
to Paul is 
(6.4) 
when Peter uses strategy c, Paul uses strategy s, and 8 is true. 
Since a(x) and indicator functions are bounded, the integral 
will be well defined if s(x) is ess. sup-bounded. For each fixed 
c and s, the expected payoff can be studied as a function in 0, 
and as in previous chapters, we will investigate the behavior of 
Ge as a function in 9 as Paul varies s against a fixed c. 
s 
Definition 6. 1. 
Let Peter use strategy c for some fixed confidence interval 
specification where the expected payoff is determined by (6.4). 
C Then q will denote the space of expected payoff functions as s 
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For any set C e C let C = {9: {x, 9) e: C) X• and C • e = {x : ( X ' e) e C ) 
denote cross section sets of c. 
The role of the master of ceremonies is similar to that of 
previous chapters which study discrete spaces. In the Confidence 
Interval Model {Model CI) the master of ceremonies determines an 
a measurable function a{x) where O ~ a(x) ~ 1 for all x e X. 
One may interpret a(x) as the confidence level of a confidence 
interval when x is observed. The elements {x, a, µ), {@, 8, A), 
(ij, C, µ X A), f, and a denote a confidence interval specification 
and are considered to be fixed throughout the discussion. The 
remaining tasks of the master of ceremonies are to select 90 €@ 
at his leisure and to observe x e X according to the distribution 
P(X :=: xje0). The x is revealed to Peter and Paul while the a0 is 
retained until the wagers have been placed. Now we come to Peter's role. 
Peter, being confronted with a confidence interval specification, 
must select a measurable set Ce C such that for each x e X he 
is willing to assert the probability that 9 e C · 0 x• is a( x) ; i.e. , 
"P( e0 e ex.) = a{x)." He does this with the knowledge that Paul is 
allowed to test his probability assertions by placing a positive or 
negative bet on the event a0 e C for the sample point x. Thus, X• 
Paul determines an G measurable stake function s{x) which combined 
with ·a{x) determines the amount that Paul bets on e0 e C • The X• 
strategies of Peter and Paul are denoted by c and s respectively. 
Once the wagers are made the master of ceremonies reveals 90 , 
and Peter and Paul settle up. For an observed sample point x, the 
payoff to Paul is 
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6.1 Introduction. 
The conditional behavior of confidence interval procedures in 
continuous spaces is the focal point of at least two papers, Buehler 
(1959) and Wallace (1959). Both of these introduce criteria for 
considering the appropriateness of.confidence proC?edures. With a 
similar goal, we generalize Model I of Chapter IV to continuous 
sample and parameter spaces and study confidence procedures in view 
of coherence. 
Our model for continuous spaces is fashioned after Buehler (1959) 
and is described in Section 6.2. In Section 6.3 and 6.4 we formulate 
a version of coherence for this model and investigate its relationship 
to Bayesian solutions. A typical result roughly states that if Peter 
is to avoid semi-positive expected payoff functions, then he must 
be TT-Bayes where TT is a function belonging to an appropriate LP 
space. In Section 6.5 we discuss the relationship between coherence 
and the papers of Buehler and Wallace. 
6.2 Description of a Model for Confidence Intervals. 
Throughout this chapter (X, G, µ) and (®, a, X) will denote 
measure spaces with a-finite measure µ and i. Suppose ~ is the 
product space X x ®, and C is the a-field over a x a. Let µ, x X 
denote the usual product measure over C. Let f be a C measurable 
function on ~ which is a density with respect to µ, i.e., 
(6.1) I f(x, a)dµ,{x) = 1 for all a e ® 
J f(x, S)dµ(x) = P(Ale) for all A e G. 
A 
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(5.24) G~(e) = EcijG~. _(9), 
1J 
and since Ga e 1,P and TT corresponds to a continuous lin·ear 
s 
functional on 1,P we have 
(5.25) < Ga, TT > = ~c . . < Ga , TT > = 0. 
s 1J sij 
The conclusion follows from (5.25). D 
Note that (5.21) depends.on TT, p(x, a), and on the chosen sets 
in a complicated way. At the present we do not know of any simple 
conditions which show that Bayes' solutions based on improper priors 
are coherent. With this we conclude our discussion of sufficient 
conditions. 
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that s{n) ~ oo; this contradicts the sup-boundedness of s. Thus , 
we can conclude that the expanded intersection is empty. Hence a 
is strictly coherent. 
5.4 iP Theory for Improper Priors. 
In this section we present a method which uses tp theory to 
show that some improper Bayes' strategies are coherent. The 
technique involves finding a sufficient condition which implies 
that G~(e) is a member of 
type (p). 
Jl for all s if the p.m.f. is of 
Theorem 5.3. 
Assume Model I; the p.m.f. is of type (p), and a is (q) weak 
Bayes w.r.t. TT> 0 [TT~ O]. If 
(5.21) 
then a 
Proof: 
is strictly [weakly] coherent. 
For sup-bounded stake functions and v as defined in the proof 
of Theorem 5.1, (5.21) implies 
(5.22) 
N(x) 
~ ~ 11 v( x , 8 , i ) s . ( x) p ( x , 9) 11 < oo • 
X i=l 1 p 
By Theorem 3.13-C of Taylor (1961, p. 100), (5.22) implies 
a member of iP. Since a is Bayes we have 
(5.23) 
where C' 
function. 
< Ga , TT>= 0 for all siJ" e C' s .. 1J 
is defined by (4.4). 
Then 
Let c .. be the elements of a stake 
1] 
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(5.16) s(4) ~ s(3) + s{2) - s(1) 
s(5) ~ 2s(3) + -s{l) 
s(6) ~ 2s{3) + s{2) - 2s{l) 
s{7)::: 3s{3) - 2s(l) 
s{8) ~ 3s{3) + s{2) - 3s(l), 
and in general for i = 4, 6, 8, ••• , we have 
(5.17) s{i) ~ ci;2 )•{s{3) - s(l)) + s{2). 
Since s{3) - s(l) < 0, (5.17) implies s(i) is unbounded which 
contradicts the sup-bound- property of s and thus s(3) - s(l) ~ O. 
Since (5.15) holds, s(2) - s(O) must be less than zero. By a 
similar argument s(-i) for i = -3, -5, ••• will be unbounded. 
Since s is sup-bounded (5.13) cannot hold, and Qa does not 
contain any semi-positive vector. 
Although Lemma. 5.1 implies an empty expanded intersection we 
give an alternate argument. Without loss of generality we 
can choose p0 in Definition 3.1 to be zero except for p0 (1) = 1. 
Suppose s is such that IIPo + p - G~ll 1 ~ e for some choice of p. 
Let e = 1/4 and define t{i) = s{i+l) - s(i-1). Then we have 
(5.18) 8Ga(l) = t(l) - t(2) > 6. 
s -
Assume w.l.g. that -t(2) ~ 3. This implies 
n 
(5.19) e ~ ~ jp(i) - Ga(i)I for all n > 2 
i=2 8 
which gives 
n-1 
(5.20) 2 = Be ~ I ~ 8p ( i) - t ( 2) + t ( n) I + I 8p ( n) - t ( n) + t ( n+ 1) I . 
i=2 
Since -t{2) ~ 3, this means that t{n)::: -1 for all n which shows 
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Examples 5.1 and 5.2 show that for a specification in which the 
master of ceremonies uses his option and fixes a particular collection 
of sets Ai(x), some priors in Lq have posterior probabilities 
which are strictly coherent and others do not. In order to show 
that the conditions (5.6), (5.9),or (5.10) are not necessary for 
coherence, we present Example 5.3. A point of interest is that the 
uniform prior over ® is used. 
Example 5.3. 
and 
Let ® = X = {O, _±1, .±2, etc.), N(x) = 1, A(x) = {x, x+l), G = {A(x)}, 
0) = I 0 1/4 p(x, X = 0-1, 9, 0+1, 0+2 elsewhere. 
Suppose· TT(9) is uniform over ®, then a(x) = 1/2. Note that 
none of (5.6), (5.9),and (5.10) hold. To show that there exists no 
sup-bounded s (X such that G is semi-positive, we assume without 
s 
loss of generality (w.l.g.) that 
(5.13) Ga(l) > 0 s 
and 
(5.14) Ga(0) > 0 for all 9 e ®· 
s -
After computing the expected payoff (5.13) implies 
(5.15) -s(O) + s(l) + s(2) - s(3) > O. 
We may assume w.l.g. that s(3) - s(l) < 0 (for not both s(3) - s{l) 
and s(O) - s(2) could be greater than zero). By (5.14) we have 
i 
the following string of inequalities .: 
- 65 -
choose the sets so that one of the conditions holds. On the other 
hand, if the master of ceremonies has used his option and fixed the 
sets, then not all priors in tq will give posterior probabilities 
such that one of the conditions will be satisfied. If this is so, 
then other means are needed to show coherence. 
Consider once again Example 5.1. We see 
(5.12) ~ 1 • { ½ ·½ + ½ •½) = 00 
X 
and so (5.9), (5.10), and hence, (5.6) fail to hold. Possibly this 
is connected with the non-coherence of a. Since the a which is 
(oo) weak Bayes w.r.t. TT= 1 is not weakly coherent, one might 
question if there is any TT e £00 such that a Bayesian solution is 
strictly or weakly coherent. Example 5.2 shows that there is at 
least one. 
Example 5 .2. 
Consider the specification of Example 5.1. Let TT(B) = TT(-9) 
where Values of TT 
9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 etc. 
TT(B) 1 1 1 1/9 1/16 1 1 1/49 1/64 
Then for e ~ 2 we have 
and so 
" 11 x-l)TT x+l ~ (i)-2. 
u TT x-1 +TT x+l < 2 + 2 L.J 
X i=l 
Thus (5.6) holds, and by Theorem 5.2, a which is (oo) weak Bayes 
w.r.t. the above TT is strictly coherent. 
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(5.9) 
N(x) 
~E p(x, 0)11( a)( 'E a. {x)(l-a. {x))) < co:, and 
1. 1. 
X ® i=l 
(ii) a sufficient condition for (5.9) is 
N(x) 
(5.10) 6 llp(x, •)II { ~ a.(x)(l-a1(x)}) < 00 • X p i=l 1. 
Proof: 
(i} By using (4.13) and interchanging the ordc~r of sunnna.tion, 
(5.8) is equal to the left hand side of (5.9). 
(ii) Since p(x, i) e iP for all x and TT e tq, by Holder's 
inequality we have 
(5.11) 
Thus, (5.10) implies (5.9), and combining this with Lennna 5.2 gives 
the conclusion. D 
Theorem 5.2. 
Assume Model I; p.m.f. is type {p), and a is {q) weak Bayes 
w.r.t. TT> 0 [11 ~ O]. If (5.6), (5.9), or (5.10) holds, then a 
is strictly [weakly] coherent. 
Proof: 
By Lennna. 5.2 or 5.3, we see (5.7) holds. Thus, for any sup-bounded 
s, the left hand side of (5.3) is finite. Now apply Tonelli's Theorem 
to interchange the order of sunnna.tion in (5.4) and proceed as in the 
proof of Theorem 5.1. D 
Conditions (5.6), (5.9), and (5.10) often depe11d in a complex 
manner on the improper prior lT and the sets A. (x). 
1. 
If the master 
of ceremonies has not used his option, then Peter has the flexibility 
to choose the sets, and for an arbitrary prior in .eq, perhaps he can 
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coherent Bayesian Q' in either Model I or Model II. We wil 1, however, 
develop some sufficient conditions concentrating on Model I. A 
convenient method of proving a Bayesian Q' to be strictly [weakly] 
coherent is to form the inner product of GQ' with n, interchange 
s 
the order of summation, and show the inner sunnna.tion to be identically 
zero. Lemma 5.2 gives a sufficient condition which allows the use 
of Tonelli's Theorem for interchanging the order of sununation. 
Lenuna 5.2. 
Assume p(x, 8) is type (p) where p e [1, oo], and Q' is (q) 
weak Bayes w.r.t. n. Let W = {x: E@f'(x, 0)n(0) > 0). If 
(5.6) 
then 
(5.7) 
Proof: 
N(x) 
'E ~ ~ v( x , e , i) p ( x , a) n( a) < 00 • 
S X i=l 
Since p(x, 8) and n are non-negative, by Tonelli's Theorem 
and the definition of a, (5.7) equals 
(5.8) 
N(x) 
~ ~ { tJ ( 1-a. ( x ) ) p ( x , a) n( a) + 'E a. ( x) p ( x , a) rt( e ) J • 
X i=l 9eAi (x) 1. 0~/x) 1. 
The value of (5.8) is not changed if the sum over X is restricted 
to the sum over W, and by the definition of a, (5.8) equals twice 
the left hand side of (5.6) which is finite by assumption. D 
Lemma 5.3. 
Assume p(x, a) is type (p) where p e [1, oo], and Q' is (q) 
weak Bayes w.r.t. n. Then (i) (5.6);holds if and only if 
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if X < 0 if X > 0 
elsewhere elsewhere. 
Then we have 
dl'(o) = (1-½) .1 •P(l, o) + (.1-½) •l•p(-1, o) = ½ 
s 
and for any 0 > 1, 
ca(a) = (1-½)•l•p(e+1, a) - ½•l•p(a-1, e) = o. 
s 
Similarly Ga(e) equals zero for 9 <-1. Hence, although d is 
s 
weak Bayes it is not strictly coherent. To make matters worse consider 
the stakes 
if X < 0 2 - 1/lxl if X > 0 
elsewhere elsewhere. 
For 9 :=: 2 we have 
Ga(a) = (1-½)(2-(e+1)-1)p(e+1,e) - ½(2-(e-1)-1)p(a-1, a) 
s 
and by symmetry Easy calculations give 
Thus, a is not even weakly coherent. A similar result was achieved 
by Rubin (1971, p. 340) who proposed a randomized strategy in which 
Paul chooses a probability of betting (a unit stake) for each x. 
This example shows that one can avoid the randomized strategy by 
suitably chosen stakes. 
At the present it is not known what conditions are necessary and 
sufficient t·o insure that TT e Jl will produce a strictly [weakly] 
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prior TT used to compute the Bayesian posterior probabilities. That 
is, Peter can post probabilities which agree with posterior probabilities 
for any TT> 0, and a will be strictly coherent. In the next section 
we present some sufficient conditions for a Bayes' solution based 
on an improper TT e iP to be coherent. In these cases Peter will 
have to exercise caution in the choice of the sets, and not all priors 
will have associated posterior probabilities which are coherent. 
5.3 Priors in iP where p e (1, oo]. 
Now we consider the case where the p.m.f. of a specification 
is of type (p); p e (1, oo]. From the preceding section we know that 
if a is proper Bayes, then a is coherent. If we can show a 
similar result holds for improper priors TT e tq, then the class of 
strategies which are coherent is enlarged. We note that for type 
(p) p.m.f. 1s, < p(x, 9),TT(9) > is finite for any TT e tq; this 
follows from Holder's inequality. Thus, when < p(x, 9), TT(8) > > 0, 
a is well defined by (4.13). Before presenting some sufficient 
conditions which imply weak Bayes' strategies are coherent, we give 
anexample for which p(x, a) is type (1}; TT> 0 is in 00 t, and a 
is (oo) weak Bayes w.r.t. TT but not strictly or even weakly coherent. 
Example 5.1. (Similar examples appear in Buehler (1971, p. 337), 
Fraser (1971, p. 49), and Lindley (1971, p. 50).) 
Let ® = X = {0, _:!:1, _:!:2, etc.); N(x) = 2; A1(x) = {x+l}; ~(x) = A1(x), 
and 
p(x, e) = ! ! 
elsewhere. 
Suppose TT(9) is the uniform prior over @; then a 1(x) = a2 (x) = 1/2. 
Let Paul use strategy s such that 
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Proof for Model I: 
Define v(x, a, i) = (IA.Ce) - ai(x)). For any sup-bounded 
]. 
stake function s we have 
(5.3) " N(x) 6 u ~ I v( x , 8 , i) I • I s / x) I P ( x , 9) TT( 9) 
® X i=l 
< M•N 6~ p(x, 9)TT(9) = M•N 
- ®X 
where N = sup N(x) and M = sup Is. (x) I• By the 
X X and i=l to N(x) l. 
assumptions of Model I, M and N are finite. Thus, by Tonelli's 
theorem (Royden (1963, p. 234)), we can interchange the order of 
summation in 
(5.4) 
N(x) 
E E ~ v( x , 0 , i) s . ( x) p ( x, e) TT( 0) ]. 
@ X i=l 
to give 
(5.5) 
N(x) 
~ ~ S i ( X) 1J V( X, 9 , i) p ( X , 0) TT( 9) • 
X i=l ® 
Since a is proper Bayes w.r.t. TT by (4.13), the summation over 
@ is zero for all x and i. Thus we have < Ga TT>= 0 for all 
s' 
sup-bounded s. Assume TT> O; then for all s such that G~(e0 ) > O 
for some e0 e ®, there exists a e' such that G~(e') < o. Hence 
Qa contains no semi-positive vector. Apply Lennna 5.1 to see that 
the expanded intersection of 
hold for TT> o. 
Proof for Model II: 
lf and P p is empty. Similar counnents 
By applying (4.18) we see·that the left hand side of an equation 
analogous to (5.3) is finite, and the proof follows as above. D 
Note that in these theorems, since TT is in t 1 , strict [weak] 
coherence does not depend on the choice of sets 
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{A.(x)} or on the 
]. 
(5.1) 
Lennna 5.1. 
if p C ( 1, oo) 
if p = 00 
if p = 1. 
Assume the p.m.f. is type {p) and a is either (q) weak Bayes 
w.r.t. TT> 0 [TT?:: O] for p e [1, oo) or BA Bayes w.r.t. y > O 
[y?:: O] for p = oo. Then the expanded intersection of lf and p 
the set of semi-positive [positive] vcictors in iP is empty. 
Proof: 
Let 
for all 
we have 
(5.2a) 
p e [ 1, oo) • Since 
s . . e C' where C' 
l.J 
G'¥ ( 9) = I:! C • • Ga ( 9) 
s l.J s .. l.J 
a is Bayes we have 
is defined by (4.4). 
for suitable choice of c ..• By Irolder's inequality TT corresponds 
1.J 
to a continuous linear functional on lf giving p 
(5.2b) < Ga TT > = r: c < Ga , TT > = O, s, ij s .. 
l.J 
and the conclusion follows from Theorem 3.5. The proof for p = oo 
is similar. 0 
Now we use this lennna to show proper Bayes' strategies are coherent. Froml.aJ 
the proof of Theorem 5 .. 1 we will see that the coherence of a proper Bayes' a 
is independent of the sets on which the bets are placed. Thus, it is im-
material whether Peter chooses the sets or the master of ceremonies uses his 
option. This not the case with weak Bayes' solutions, which are discussed 
in later sections. 
Theorem 5.1. 
Assume Model I or II. If a is proper Bayes w.r.t. TT> 0 [TT?:: O], 
then a is strictly [weakly] coherent. 
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CHAPTER V 
Coherent Proper and Improper Bayes' Strategies 
for Countable Spaces 
5.1 Introduction. 
Now we turn our attention to the converse problem of Chapter ·Iv; 
that is, in Model I or II, will a strategy that is consistent with 
either proper, BA, or improper Bayes' solution be coherent. The 
treatment of proper Bayes' solutions is very tractable since we can 
interchange the order of summation by applying Tonelli's Theorem 
to prove that proper Bayes' strategies are coherent. 
For improper Bayes' strategies, the general answer is obscured 
since the conditions for Tonelli's Theorem are not always satisfied. 
We explore this case by presenting a mixture of theorems and examples. 
The theorems give some sufficient conditions for interchanging the 
order of summation --either by Tonelli's Theorem or tp theory. The 
examples show that: not all improper Bayes solutions are coherent, the 
sufficient conditions given are not necessary, and other techniques besides 
interchanging the order of sununation can be used to demonstrate coherence. 
The coherence of BA weak Bayes' strategies will not be covered 
and is an open question. Section 5.2 deals with proper Bayes' strategies 
for Model I and II. Improper Bayes' strategies are studied in 
Sections 5.3 and 5.4. 
5.2 Proper Bayes' Strategies. 
Before we present Theorem 5.1 we give a lennna which will be used 
not only with proper Bayes' strategies but also with improper ones. 
Throughout this chapter we assume that q is defined by 
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countably sup-bounded, i.e., Ejai(x')si(x')I < 1. By the disjointness 
of the sets A.(x'), for all 9 e ® we have 
l. 
00 00 
(4.20) 0 [ IA ( , ) ( 9) - Q' • ( X 1 ) ] S • ( X 1 ) = 1 - ~ ai ( X 1 ) > 0. 
i=l i X l. l. i=l 
Since p(x', e) > o for some 9 e ®, .G~(9) is semi-positive. [For 
weak coherence, this process at all X implies Ga(e) is positive.] 
s 
This contradicts the assumption of strict [weak] coherence and thus 
i 
(4.19) cannot hold, so that the probability assertions nrust be countably 
additive. 0 
As in Model I we note _that if a is strictly coherent then the 
probability assertions are consistent with posterior probabilities 
--
... 
which are well defined. Also we point out that proper priors correspond ._ 
to a bounded finitely additive set function on ®, but not all 
bounded finitely additive set functions correspond to proper priors. 
It was first conjectured that coherence for type (oo) p.m.f.'s in 
Model II would imply that a was consistent with a proper Bayes 
solution. We have been unable to show this although it may be true. 
This completes our discussion of the implications of coherence in 
these models. 
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Proof: 
(i) follows as in Theorem 4.1. (ii) is a consequence of a 
being (q) weak Bayes. D 
The above result is not surprising since the countable additivity 
follows directly from {q) weak Bayes. With a type {oo) p.m.f. the 
countable additivity does not follow from the Bayesian property since 
strict or weak coherence only implies BA weak Bayes. A technique 
found in the proof of Theorem 6 of Heath and Sudderth (1972) will 
be used to show countable additivity. If the p.m.f. of X was 
concentrated at a single point x0 for all 9, then Theorem 4.4 
would be similar to a part of Theorem 6 of Heath and Sudderth. 
Theorem 4.4. 
Assume that in Model II the p.m.f. is of type {oo), and that 
Peter's strategy is a. If a is strictly (weakly] coherent, then 
(i) there exists ye r such that y(9) > 0 [y(e) 2: O] for all 0, 
and a is BA weak Bayes w.r.t. y, and (ii) the probability assertions 
P(0 e Alx) = a(x, A) agree with a countably additive probability 
measure On G for each Xe X. 
Proof: 
As in Theorem 4.2 strict [weak] coherence implies a is BA 
weak Bayes w .r. t. y > 0 [y 2: O] where y e r. Assume that for 
some x' Peter's probability assertions are not countably additive. 
This means there exists a disjoint sequence {Ai(x')}~=l such that 
00 
(4.19) 
The stake function s = 0 
00 
while ½ a.(x') < 1. 
i=l 1. 
except for si(x') = 1; i 
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= 1,2, ••. is 
T(x) is Paul's total stake when x is observed, and if s 
is countably sup-bounded then Paul's total stake at x is uniformly 
bounded. Since for each x the sets are required to be disjoint, 
we have 
00 
(4.18) 
which is uniformly bounded in x. Thus, the expected payoff (4.2) 
is well defined for countably sup-bounded s. We define two spaces 
of expected payoff functions as in Section ~.3. 
Definition 4.13. 
ct* Assuming a fixed specification, q will denote the space of 
expected payoff functions, Ga(a), as s ranges over all countably 
s 
sup-bounded stake functions. '( will denote the intersection of 
qa* and tp where the p.m.f. of the specification is of type (p). 
Clearly net* · 1· i ~ is a inear space n £00 , and '( is a linear 
space which contains payoff functions Ga(e) for s e C {see Lemma 4.1). '-
s 
Let us replace lf and qa with lf'* and qcr* in the definition p p 
of coherence {Def. 4.9) and consider a countably additive version 
of Theorem 4.1. 
Theorem 4.3. 
Assume that in Model II the p.m.f. is of type (p) where p e [1, oo), -' 
and that Peter's strategy is a. If a is strictly [weakly] coherent 
then (i) there exists TT> 0 [n ~ O] such that a is (q) weak Bayes 
w.r.t. TT where q = p/(p-1) if p e (1, oo); q = oo if p = 1, and 
{ii) the probability assertions P(e e Alx) = a{x, A) agree with a 
countably additive probability measure on a for each fixed x e X. 
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finitely additive probability on a{x). It is of interest to note 
that in Model I it was not necessary to include the assumption that 
the sets {A1{x)} are closed under complementation toachieve the 
conclusion of Theorem 4.1 and 4.2. However, to compare Peter's 
probability assertions with a-additive probabilities on the subsets 
of ®, we introduce these modifications. 
In Model II, a will denote the collection of all subsets of ®, 
and a specification will denote the elements X, ®, p: Xx®, and a. 
For each x e X and A e G, Peter is required to state his probability 
of 9 € A. That is, Peter asserts "P(9 e: Alx) = a(x, A)" for all 
A e a. For each x, Paul will choose a countable disjoint sequence 
{Ai (x) ):=l 
} 
from a and place stakes Si (x) on these sets. In 
summary, the significant changes in Model II are that, for each 
observed sample point x, Peter must assert the probabilities of all 
subsets of the parameter space from which Paul is allowed to choose 
a countable disjoint sequence for the purpose of betting. 
These modifications, however, innnediately complicate the existence 
of ·the expected payoff to Paul, and in fact, (4.2) might not be well 
defined even for sup-bounded stake functions. To avoid this difficulty 
we restrict Paul to countably sup-bounded strategies s. To simplify 
the notation let a.(x) = a(x, A.(x)). ]. l. 
Definition 4.12. 
Paul's strategy s is said to be countably sup-bounded if s 
is sup-bounded and 
(4.17) sup T(x) < 00 where T{x) = 
xe:X 
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Theorem 4.2. 
Assume that in Model I the p.m.f. of a specification is type (oo), 
and that Peter's strategy is a. If a is strictly [weakly] coherent, 
then there exists ye r such that y(a) > O [y(e)?: O] for all 
9 e ®, and a is BA weak Bayes w.r.t. y. 
Proof: 
The proof is similar to Theorem 4.1 where we appeal to Theorem 3.6 
instead of Theorem 3.5. D 
We point out that ai(x) is well defined by equation {4.16) 
whenever J p{x, 9)dy(9) > o. Even though Theorem 4.2 does not show 
y to be a countably additive set function, it does imply y(9) > 0 
for all 9 if a is strictly coherent. Since p{x, 90) > 0 for 
some a0 e ®, we have J p(x, 9)dy(9)?: p(x, e0)y(e0 ) > O. Thus 
ai(x) is well defined by (4.16) whenever a is strictly coherent. 
On the other hand if a is weakly coherent, then ai{x) need not 
be well defined by (4.16) for all x and i; of course this is 
related to the weak coherence of a. 
4.4 Coherence and Its Implications in a Modified Game, Model 11. 
We propose to modify the Peter-Paul game introduced in Section 4.2 
and study a-additive probability assertions. The new game will be 
called Model II. In the previous game Peter was required to post 
only a finite number of probabilities on the sets 
we add the assumption that for each x, the sets 
{A.(x)}. Suppose 
]. 
· ( )}N(x) (Ai x i=l are a 
field, say a{x). Since strict [weak] coherence implies Bayes' solutions, 
even in the case of type (oo) p.m.f.'s, we see that for each x strict 
[weak] coherence implies that Peter's probabilities agree with a 
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(4.14) 
which is equivalent to (4.13). Since (4.14) holds for all sij e C', a 
is (q) weak Bayes w.r.t. TI> O. 
Proof for Weakly Coherent is Similar. D 
We draw attention to the fact that the p in the type (p) 
assumption is assumed finite in Theorem 4.1. If we generalized the 
statement of Theorem 4~1 to include p = oo, then this would mean that 
TT used in the Bayesian solution would be a member of t 1 • Up to 
now we have been unable to obtain such a result with Model I introduced 
in Section 4.2. The difficulty stems from the fact that the space 
congruent to the conjugate space of t00 is not 1 t; on the contrary, 
it is the space of bounded finitely additive set functions. For 
this reason we modify the definition of (p) weak Bayes to BA weak 
Bayes. 
Definition 4.11. 
Let r be the class of all bounded finitely additive set functions 
on all possible subsets of ®· Then Peter's a is said to be BA weak 
Bayes w.r.t. y if and only if there exists ye r such that 
(4.15) y{ e) > 0 for all 9 e ®, 
and 
(4.16) f p(x, e)dy(a) = ai{x) J p(x, e)dy(a) 
aeAi {x) 9e@ 
holds for all x e X and i = 1, ••• , N{x). 
With this modified definition we state a result for type (oo) 
p .m. f. 's. 
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[positive] vector and (ii) the expanded intersection of i' and p 
the set of all semi-positive [positive] vectors in tp is empty. 
Suppose we consider type (p) p.m.t.'s where p < oo. In 
Theorem 4.1 it will be proven that if a is strictly coherent, 
then a must be consistent with a Bayesian solution. Let us formally 
define this and present Theorem 4.1. 
Definition 4.10. 
For p e (1, oo] Peter's a is said to be (p) weak Bayes w.r.t. 
TT if and only if there exists a function TT such that 
LTT(9)p < oo (written TT e tP), and 
n: ®-' [ o , oo ) , 
(4.13) ~ p ( x , 9) TT{ 9) = a i ( x) L) p ( x , 8) TT( 8) 
SeAi (x) Se® 
holds for all x e X and i = 1 to N{x). When p = 1, "(p) weak" 
may be replaced by "proper." 
Theorem 4.1. 
Assume that in Model I the p.m.f. of a specification is type (p) 
where p e (1, oo), and that Peter's strategy is a. If a is strictly 
[weakly] coherent, then there exists TT> 0 [TT~ O] such that a is 
(q) weak Bayes w.r.t. TT where q = p/(p-1) if p e (1, oo); q = oo 
if p = 1. 
Proof for Strictly Coherent. 
By definition strict coherence ~mplies the expanded intersection 
of ~ and the semi-positive vectors in tp is empty. Hence, by 
Theorem 3.5 there exists a TT such that > 0 11q a d < Ga > -- 0 TT , TT e Ju , n TT, 
s 
for all Ga e lf. Payoffs for stake functions in C' are in lf, 
s p p 
and so for each sij e C', we have 
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set of semi-positive vectors have a non-empty expanded intersection 
(see Definition 3.1). This is true even though the intersection 
of qa and the set of semi-positive vectors is empty. 
To see that the expanded intersection is non-empty let P be 
equal to the set of semi-positive vectors in t 1 • Let e > 0 be 
arbitrary but fixed. Then there exists a positive integer J such 
that Let Paul specify a stake function s which is 
identically zero except for s(J) = 2J2 • The expected payoff is 
(4.12) Ga(e) = -K J-2 if 9 = 1 s 1 
~ if a = 2 
J2 if a =N+2 
0 elsewhere. 
For p0 = (0, K2 , 0, O, ••• ) and p with all elements zero except 
for J 2 in the (J+2)th position, we have 
which implies the expanded intersection of P 
IIP0 + P - G~II 1 < e 
and lft is non-empty. 
From an inference view-point this may be undesirable since even 
though there is no semi-positive payoff function, there is a sequence 
of payoff functions which comes arbitrarily close {in t1 norm) to 
semi-positive vectors. Furthermore, if we let Ga(+) and Ga(-) 
s s 
be the positive and negative parts of Ga 
s' 
then IIG~( + >ll1 can be 
made arbitrarily large while l\G~(- )11 1 goes to zero. To avoid 
this difficulty we suggest the following definition of coherence. 
Definition 4.9 • 
For a type (p) p.m.f., Peter's a is said to be strictly 
[weakly] coherent if and only if (i) qa contains no semi-positive 
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Example 4.2. 
Let X = ® = {l, 2, 3, ••• ), A= {l)c, G = {A), N(x) - 1, and 
p(x, a) K1x -4 for a = 1 = 
K2x 
-2 for 0·= 2 
1 for 8 = 3, 4, ••• if X = e - 2 
0 elsewhere 
(~1-4)-l and where K1 and K2 are equal to ~ (
~i-2)-1 ~ respectively. 
Suppose Peter's strategy is a(x) - 1 = 12• Then for a stake function s n 
which is identically zero except for s(n) = 2, the expected payoff is 
(4.10) Ga (0) -Kn -4 if a 1 = = s 1 
n 
-2 K2n if e = 2 
1 if 9 = n + 2 
0 elsewhere. 
Clearly Ga is not semi-positive for a stake function s which 
s 
contains any negative stake, and for any non-trivial non-negative 
stake function Thus qa contains no semi-positive 
vector and a is strictly coherent by the above definition. 
Suppose there is a positive vector orthogonal to qa. This 
implies TT is orthogonal to Ga which means 
s 
(4.11) 
n 
4 
n TT = 0. 
n 
Since nn > 0 we have K1n1 > n
2½n2 for all n which is impossible 
because ~n2 > O. Hence, there is no positive orthogonal vector. 
The failure of this version of coherence to imply that a is 
Bayes w.r.t. TT> 0 hinges on the fact that if and the 
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These elements determine the specification. Clearly p(x, 0) e L1 
for all x e X, and lf C _e,1. p From (4.2) we have 
(4.8) 
Let s' denote a stake function which is zero for odd x and 
one for even x. Clearly s' is sup-bounded and 
(4.9) G~,(e) = ½[1 - a1(e+1)] if e e A 
-½ a 1(e) if 0 ~ A • 
Thus, max{IGa,(e)I, lGa,(0+1)1) > 1/4 for e e A, and for finite p, 
s s 
Ga,(9) ¢ iP which implies Qa ~ LP. 
s 
Now, let us attempt to find a suitable definition of coherence 
for countably infinite spaces. Our goal is an extended version which 
can be used in considering necessary and sufficient conditions for 
a Bayesian solution. A natural extension of the previous definition 
of coherence is to replace the space of expected payoffs qA with 
Qa. The extended definition would be: for a fixed specification, 
a is said to be strictly coherent if and only if Qa contains no 
semi-positive vector. An analogous result based on this definition 
is: if a is strictly coherent, then a is Bayes w.r.t. TT where 
TT> O. The proof of this type of a result relies on the existence 
of a strictly positive vector TT which is orthogonal to the space 
of payoff functions Qa. This conjecture, however, is false as we 
see from the next example. Here we have a strategy a for which 
Qa contains no semi-positive vector, but there is no positive orthogonal 
vector. 
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Lemma 4.1. 
G:{a) e: ~ for all s e C. Thus,~ is not empty. 
Proof: 
(4.5) 
For any sij e C' the expected payoff is 
a I [l _ ai{xj)]p(j, a) if 
G (9) = 
8 ij - ai{xj)p(j, a) if 
and so 
(4.6) 
Thus, for any s e C 
(4.7) 
9 e: A.{x.) 
1 J 
9 t A. (x.), 
1 J 
where the sum is taken over a finite number of x e: X, and for each 
x over a finite number of i. All terms in the sum are finite by 
the definition of C and type (p). The conclusion follows by 
considering the definition of lf. D p 
Many p.m.f.'s are of type {p) where the p is finite, and 
hence, lf is a non-empty linear manifold contained in tP. The p 
significance of the p will be seen later, but in passing, we point 
out that even though lf c tp for finite p, Qa need not be contained p 
in tp space for any finite p, as the next example shows. 
Example 4.1. 
Let X = ® = {O, ±1, ± 2, etc.}, A= {±1, ±3, etc.}, u = {A}, 
N(x) = 1, and [ 112 
p(x, e) = 1~2 
X = 9 
X = 9 + 1 
elsewhere. 
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Definition 4.5. 
Assuming a fixed specification, Qa wi11 denote the space of 
·payoff functions s ranges over all sup-bounded stake 
functions. 
It is easy to verify that Qa is a linear manifold contained 
00 in I. Now, let us consider a second space of expected payoff 
functions which is defined in terms of a property of the p.m.f. in 
the specification. 
Definition 4.6. 
A function on XX® which is a p.m.f. on X for every 9 is 
said to be of type {p) if p{x, !) e tp for all x e X. That is, 
I:®lp(x, e) Ip < 00 for all X ex. 
Definition 4.7. 
If the p.m.f. of the specification is of type (p), then let 
~ denote the intersection of a q and Note if p = oo, then 
~ is equal to Qa. 
Clearly ~ is a linear manifold. We will show that ~ is 
non-empty after defining two classes of stake functions. 
Definition 4.8. 
Let C be the class of sup-bounded stake functions such that 
s.(x) = 0 except for a finite number of x and i. Let C' be 
l. 
a class of stake functions where 
(4.4) c' = if j = k) for elsewhere j = 1,2,... } i = 1 to N(x.) • 
J 
That is for any sij e C', the values of 
a single x and i. 
s .. are zero except for 
1.J 
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and for each x, the payoff is the sum of payoffs in (4.1) 
over L We assume s. (x) is finite _so that this sum is well defined. 
1. 
As in Chapter II we consider an expected payoff to Paul over the 
sample space. 
Definition 4.3. 
The expected payoff to Paul as a function of 0, a, s will be 
denoted by Ga(a) and is computed by i.. 
s 
(4.2) 
N(x) 
Ga ( 8) = ~ . }_J [IA. {x) ( 8) - a i ( X) ] S / X) p ( X, 0) • 
s X 1.=l 1. 
The question of Ga(a) being well defined arises immediately. 
s 
It is easily seen that unbounded stakes may leave (4.2) undefined 
regardless of the choice of a. For this reason it is convenient 
to restrict Paul to sup-bounded stakes. 
Definition 4.4. 
Pauls stakes s are said to be sup-bounded if and only if 
{4.3) sup { max I s . ( x) I) = M < oo • 
xeX i=l, ••• ,N(x) 1. 
This completes the description of the Peter-Paul game calied Model I. 
4.3 Coherence and Its Implications in Model I. 
In Section 4.2 an expected payoff to Paul was introduced, and 
its existence for 0 e ® was discussed for sup-bounded stake functions. 
In this section we examine properties of Ga(a) as a vector in 
s 
a. 
To acconnnodate the study we consider two spaces of payoff functions 
and notice that one of these is contained in iP for suitable p. 
A portion of the iP theory developed in Chapter III is applied 
to this space yielding two main results. Let us define one of the 
spaces. 
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of odds. To be exact, Peter is confronted with a specification and 
an observed sample point x. If the master of ceremonies has not 
used his option, he nrust choose N(x) sets from Q and assert the 
probabilities of these sets. That is, for i = 1,2, ••• , N(x) he 
asserts "the probability that is equal to ex. {x)" and ]. 
must be willing to accept bets from Paul where the payoff is 
determined by the stake, cx.(x), and the truth or falsity of 0 e A.{x). ]. 1. 
Stated in terms of odds, Peter offers Paul odds of (1-cx.(x))/cx.(x) to 
1. ]. 
1 against the occurrence of 9 e A.{x). If the master of ceremonies 
1. 
has used his option, then Peter must state only the probabilities. 
Definition 4.2. 
Peter's strategy is denoted by ex whether or not the master 
of ceremonies used his option. Thus, if he has not, ex denotes the 
rule specifying the sets and the probabilities; if he has, ex denotes 
only the probabilities. 
With the knowledge of the specification and cx,·Paul determines 
a strategy, denoted by s, which governs the betting. That is, Paul 
bets with Peter on the event 9 e A.{x) risking s.{x)cx.{x) to 
]. 1. 1. 
win {1-cx. {x) )s. (x) if 0 e A. {x). Notice, s. {x) is not the stake 
1. 1. 1. ]. 
on A.{x) in usual betting terminology although we may refer to 
1. 
si{x) as such. The value of si(x) can be positive, negative, or 
zero; this allows Paul to bet on or against 0 e Ai{x). A stake 
si(x) = 0 could be interpreted as "no bet on Ai{x)." After the 
stakes are fixed, the master of ceremonies reveals 8, and they settle 
up as follows. For each i = 1 to N{x), the payoff to Paul is 
(4.1) ( 1-0!. ( X) ) S . ( X) if 0 e A. {x) ]. 1. ]. 
- cx.{x)s.{x) if 0 'A.{x), ]. ]. 1. 
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The role of the master of ceremonies is four-fold. First, 
he specifies the collection of subsets of ® from which Peter can 
choose when assigning probabilities; we denote this collection by a. 
For each x e X, Peter is required to choose N(x) sets from a, 
and for each set, state his probability. Thus, the second task of 
the master of ceremonies is to specify N(x). In Model I we assume 
that N(x) is an integer, and N{x) ~ N for all x e X where 
N < oo. 
The third task of the master of ceremonies is optional. We 
leave to his discretion the power to select the N(x) sets on which 
Peter posts probabilities. For instance, suppose N(x) E 1; then 
the master of ceremonies could ask Peter to post probabilities on A 
.• 
for all x, where A c ®· This means that A1 (x) = A and a = {A). 
When the master of ceremonies is using his option, it will be mentioned 
specifically; otherwise, we assume Peter has the responsibility to 
choose the N(x) sets from a. 
Definition 4.1. 
The items X, ®, p: Xx®, a, {N{x)}, and the option are called 
a specification. 
The fourth task of the master of ceremonies is to select a e ® 
at his leisure, and then to choose x according to the p.m.f. based on 9. 
As in previous games the x is revealed to Peter and Paul, and after 
the stakes are placed, e 
settle up. 
is disclosed so that Peter and Paul may 
Peter's role in the game is similar to that of Chapter II with 
the major difference being that he is posting probabilities instead 
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member of tP. If p > 1 then the prior may be improper. 
In Chapter II we introduced a Peter-Paul game for finite space·s 
which was phrased in terms of odds, and we noticed that infinite 
odds complicated the results stated in terms of coherence. This 
chapter deals with probability assertions; however, one can translate 
them into odds and apply the method of Section 2.5 to handle infinite 
odds. As noted previously, the main disadvantage in using odds is 
that the space of expected payoffs is a half space when infinite odds 
occur rather than a linear subspace. 
Section 4.2 descri.bes one of the Peter-Paul games of this chapter 
called Model I, and Section 4.3 investigates the implications of 
coherence in this model. Theorems 4.1 and 4.2 imply that if Peter 
is to be coherent then he must give probability assertions which 
agree with a finitely additive probability for each x; furthermore, 
they must be consistent with a Bayes' solution for some prior n. 
In the interest of investigating cr-additive probability measures, 
Section 4.4 introduces modifications of Model I to give Model II. It 
is shown that in this model coherence implies that Peter's probability 
assertions must agree with a cr-additive probability for each observed 
sample point x. 
4.2 Model I for Countably Infinite Spaces. 
The goal of this section is to describe a Peter-Paul game called 
Model I in which the sample and parameter spaces are countably infinite. 
Let {x.)~ 1 and {9.)~ 1 be enumerations of X and ® respectively, ]. l.= J J= 
and consider a fixed function p(x, 0) which is a probability mass 
function (p.m.f.) on X for each 9 (i.e.,~ p(x, 9) = 1 for all 9). 
As in Chapter II, three persons participate in the game: the master 
of ceremonies, Peter, and Paul. 
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CHAPTER IV 
Countably Infinite Parameter and Sample Spaces 
4.1 Introduction. 
In Chapter II a Peter-Paul game for finite parameter and sample 
spaces was discussed in terms of odds. In the present chapter a 
switch is made from odds to probability assertions, and concepts 
are generalized to include infinite parameter and sample spaces. 
The spirit of games based on probability assertions is stated by 
Buehler (1959): 
Many, though not all, problems of inference lead to 
assertions of the type "The probability that A is true 
is equal to ct," or, "P(A) = ct." ·. One may ask whether the 
person making this assertion should be willing to bet that 
A is true,risking an amount a to win 1 - a, and should 
be equally willing to bet that A is false, risking 1 - a 
to win a, against an opponent who has exactly the same 
information as he and who is allowed to choose either side 
of the wager. The affirmative answer will not be defended 
here, but its consequences will be examined. 
Continuing the theme, Cornfield (1969) defines a property called 
coherence and applies it to a similar situation where the inference 
is a statement about the probability of a subset of a parameter 
-# 
space given an observed sample point. The sample and parameter spaces 
of Cornfield (1969) are finite, and a typical result says that the 
inference is coherent if and only if it agrees with Bayes' rule for 
some prior n. Since the spaces are finite, the prior can be normed 
so that it is a proper prior. The introduction of countably infinite 
spaces, however, suggests that the definition of coherence could be 
altered and allows the possibility of using improper priors. In this 
chapter we will modify the definition of coherence for countably infinite ~ 
spaces, and show that it implies a Bayes' solution where the prior is a 
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Theorem 3.10. 
Let M be a linear manifold and P be the set of all semi-positive 
functions in = L. Let be an arbitrary fixed sequence of 
B measurable sets of ij• If the expanded intersection of M and 
P is empty, then there exists a bounded finitely additive set function 
y such that y(B1 ) > 0 for all i, and (3.80) and (3.82) hold. 
With these theorems established we proceed to study Peter-Paul games 
for countable and continuous spaces. 
In the cases where y(Bi) > 0 or < g, xB.> > O for a sequence 
1 
of Bi' it is easy to show that the expanded intersection through the 
elements xB. is empty. Thus, many of the previous results could be 
1 
stated in the form of necessary and sufficient conditions for separation. 
However, our interest lies mainly in the sufficiency. 
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Proof: 
As in the proof of Theorem 3.4, repeatedly apply Lemma 3.3 
instead of Theoren 3.3. 
For p = m we have the following analogous results. They are 
stated separately since continuous linear functionals on Lm are 
represented by bounded finitely additive set functions. 
Lemma 3 .4. 
If M is a linear manifold and N is a non-empty convex cone 
in Lm such that the expanded intersection of M and N is empty, 
then for any n0 e N there exists a bounded finitely additive set 
function y defined on B such that 
(3.80) 
( 3 .81) 
(3.82) 
Proof: 
J m(y) y(dy) = 0 
J n0(y) y{dy) > o 
f n(y) y(dy) ~ 0 
for all m E: M 
for all n e N. 
... 
Apply Theorem 1 of Dunford and Schwartz (1958, p. 258) to Theorem 
3.3. Cl 
Theorem 3.9. 
Let M be a linear mainfold and P be the set of all positive 
functions in L~. If the expanded intersection of M and P is 
empty, then there exists a bounded finitely additive set function y 
such that y(B) ~ 0 for all B c B, and (3.80) and (3.82) hold. 
Proof: 
Apply Lemma 3. 4 and proceed as in the proof of Theorem 3. 7. D 
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Proof: 
By Lemma 3.3, there exists g e L4 such that µ,[g f 0) > 0, 
(3.74) holds, and 
(3.75) < g, p > ~ O for al 1 p e P. 
00 
Let B = {y:g{y) < 0), and let 'ti= ~ Yi where 
i=l 
µ,(Y.) < 00. Let 
1. 
Ci = B n Yi and 'Xe . ( y) be the indicator function of C .• Then 1. 
1. 
'Xe. is in the closure of 
1. 
P, and thus, there is a sequence 00 (pj.}. 1 
1. J= 
where pji e P such that P. . .... Xe (y). By the continuity of the ]1 • 
1 
continuous linear functional defined by g, we must have 
(3.76) < g, Xe > > o. 
i 
Thus µ,(C.) = 0 and since this holds for all i, we have µ,(B) = O. 
1 
This implies that g is semi-positive. D 
Even though we are not able to show the existence of a strictly 
positive orthogonal function for continuous spaces, we can show that 
J gdu > O for a countable sequence of sets 
Bi 
of the next theorem. 
Theorem 3. 8 ~-
B. e B· l. This is the spirit 
Let M be a linear maniford and P be the set of all semi-positive 
functions in LP where p e [1, m). Let be an arbitrary 
fixed sequence of B measurable sets of ~- If the expanded inter-
section of M and P is empty, then there exists g e Lq such that 
(3.77) 
( 3. 78) 
(3.79) 
< g, m > = 0 
< g, n > ~ 0 
< g, X,B > 
i 
> 
for all m c M 
for all n &: P 
0 for all Bi • 
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(3.72) 
(J. 73) 
Proof: 
--
< f, no> > 0 
< f, n > > O for all n e N~ 
Theorem 3.3 shows the existence of a continuous linear functional 
with the desired properties. Apply Theorem 1, p. 286, if p e (1, oo), 
or Theorem 5, p. 289, if p = 1, of Dunford and Schwartz (1958) to 
~ 
. ..,.; 
-.I 
... 
... 
get the cone lus ion. 0 _. 
The results for the continuous spaces, LP, differ from the discrete 
spaces, tP. In the discrete spaces we showed that if a linear manifold 
has a non-empty expanded intersection with the semi-positive vectors, 
then there exists a positive vector orthogonal to the linear manifold. 
In LP we are only able to show that if a linear manifold has non-
empty expanded intersection with the positive functions, then there 
is a semi-positive function which is orthogonal to the linear manifold. 
Currently I believe that the result mentioned for iP does not hold 
for LP. The proof for tp uses the property that there exists a 
countable basis for the convex cone which was the set of semi-positive 
vectors. This property does not generally hold for arbitrary LP 
spaces. Our results for LP spaces are stated in the following 
theorems; in the first p e (1, oo) and in the second p = oo. 
Theorem 3.7. 
Let M be a linear manifold in LP and P be the set of all 
positive functions in LP where p e [1, oo). If the expanded 
intersection of M and P is empty, then there exists g e Lq such 
that g is semi-positive and 
(3.74) < g, m > = 0 for all .m e~M. 
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3.4 Separation Theorems for LP Space. 
Let (~, B, µ) be a measure space with a a-finite measure µ. 
Let f be a measurable function on ij, and define the norms 
II flip =- {J I f IP dµ.) l/p for p e [ 1, co) 
llfll, = ess. sup I f(y) I = inf {M: µ{y: f(y) > M) = O). 
Let LP be the space of all measurable f on ij such that 
Definition 3.4. 
A function f in LP is said to be semi-positive if £ > O 
a.e. [µ] and µ(y:f(y) > 0} > o. A tunction f in LP is said to 
be positive if f > 0 a.e. [µ]. 
Throughout this section < g, f > will denote the inner product 
between g e LP and f e L4 , where q is defined by (3.64). The 
inner product is computed. by 
(3.70) < g, f > = J gfdµ' 
and by ltolder's inequality it is well defined •. Now, we consider the 
representation of the continuous linear functionals of Theorem 3.3 
for LP spaces where p e [1, ~). 
Lennna 3.3. 
'p If M is a linear manifold in L, p e [1, ~), and N is a 
non-empty convex cone in LP such. that the expanded intersection 
of M and N is empty, then for any n0 e N there exists a 
f e Lq such that 
(3.71) < f, m > = 0 for all me M 
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